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I. INTRODUCTION
As a torts professor, I supervise students in legal externships only occa-
sionally, yet of the fewer than a dozen students I have overseen, two have re-
ported potentially dangerous situations. One worked for a verbally abusive solo
practitioner whose medication caused violent mood swings and whose urban
office was burglarized during working hours.! Another student extern was
working alone at night in the office, when an angry client, a criminal defendant,
began pounding on the office door, demanding to be let in. Field placements
provide law students with valuable real-world experiences, but the real world
can be a dangerous place. When law schools send students off-campus for prac-
tical training, the students are vulnerable to dangers from the neighborhoods
they work in, their field supervisors, their clients, opposing parties, and people
with grudges against the legal system.2
Are law schools, then, responsible for the safety of these tuition-paying
students whom they have placed in externships? The fact that legal externs are
adult graduate students in workplaces and neighborhoods beyond the physical
control of their law schools would seem to weigh against such an obligation.
The field supervisors are more aware than the law schools of the potential dan-
gers to externs and are better situated than the schools to guard against them.
The extems themselves are, in terms of their ability to care for themselves, not
She was removed from her placement.
2 See infra Part II.B.
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much different from the working attorneys they will soon be and thus have such
significant personal responsibility for their own safety that it could argue against
imposing a duty on the law schools. Yet a recent Florida case suggests that,
despite issues of control, the role of supervising attorney, and the maturity of
law students, courts may rule that law schools owe their externs a duty of care.
In an analogous situation, the Florida Supreme Court held that Nova Southeast-
ern University owed a duty of care to a Ph.D. candidate in psychology who was
fulfilling a required clinical practicum off-campus when she was abducted from
the parking lot at her assigned agency and then raped.3
For factual and legal background, Part II of this article examines the
benefits and risks of legal externships, and then Part III explains the duty con-
cept and its centrality to student negligence suits against colleges and universi-
ties and traces courts' evolving views of the duty question in these cases. Part
IV examines recent decisions most analogous to the externship relationship, and
Part V predicts how, in a transitional era of college duty law, courts are likely to
rule on the duty of law schools to externs. Finally, Part VI proposes and illus-
trates the application of a facilitator model of shared responsibility to guide law
schools and courts regarding duties to legal externs.
II. THE FIELD PLACEMENT: BENEFITS AND RISKS
A. The Growing Role of Field Placements in Legal Education
Most law schools now offer some kind of field placement program that
allows students to earn academic credit by working in law firms, government
agencies, courts, legal aid offices, and other real-world settings.4 Student ex-
terns work for free and pay their law schools for the experience, 5 which is su-
pervised by both an on-site attorney who focuses on the work product and job
performance and a faculty member who addresses broader concerns involved in
learning to be a reflective and effective attorney.6
The increased popularity of externships stems in part from external
pressures. Law students have demanded practical legal experience,7 making
externship programs a good marketing tool,8 and since a 1992 American Bar
3 Nova Southeastern Univ., Inc. v. Gross, 758 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2000).
4 Robert F. Seibel & Linda H. Morton, Field Placement Programs: Practices, Problems and
Possibilities, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 413, 423-24 (1996).
5 David F. Chavkin, Training the Ed Sparers of Tomorrow: Integrating Health Law Theory
and Practice, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 303, 318 n.53 (1994).
6 Seibel & Morton, supra note 4, at 417-18.
7 Id. at 413.
8 See, for example, the following law-school web pages, touting their externship programs:
Boston College Law School, http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/services/academic/programs/clinical
/externship; Pace Law School, http://www.law.pace.edu/jjls/extemsh.html; Quinnipiac University
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Association (ABA) Task Force Report on legal education, state bar associations
have increasingly charged law schools with the responsibility of teaching
lawyering skills as part of the J.D. curriculum. 9 In addition, the ABA now re-
quires law schools to "offer to all students: . . . adequate opportunities for in-
struction in professional skills"' 0 and to "offer live-client or other real-life prac-
tice experiences." ' 11
The ABA Task Force Report, known as the MacCrate Report, found
that law schools did well at teaching legal analysis, research, and writing, but
that graduates began their first jobs otherwise unprepared to work as lawyers
because they lacked critical lawyering skills and professional values. 12 The
MacCrate Report urged law schools to train students in ten lawyering skills:
problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investiga-
tion, communication, counseling, negotiation, litigation and alternative dispute
resolution, organizing and management of legal work, and recognizing and re-
solving ethical dilemmas. 13 The Report also called on law schools to instill pro-
fessional values beyond those embodied in the Rules of Professional Conduct, in
particular, provision of competent representation; striving to promote justice,
fairness, and morality; striving to improve the profession; and professional self-
development.1 4 In response to the Report, many schools performed self studies
to examine whether and how they were teaching the Report's critical lawyering
skills and values, and some made curricular changes including greater emphasis
on in-house clinical and field placement experiences.15
School of Law, http://www.quinnipac.edu/xl600.xml; University of Michigan Law School,
http://www.law.umich.edu/curriculum/externshipsandindependantstudy [misspelling of "inde-
pendent" is in URL]; University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law,
http://www.law.missouri.edu/career/extemshipprograms.htm; University of Nebraska College of
Law, http://www.unl.edulawcoll/extemship.html; and Whittier Law School,
http://www.law.whittier.edu/career/career.htm.
9 See Robert MacCrate, Educating a Profession: From Clinics to Continuum, 64 TENN. L.
REV. 1099, 1128-29 (1997); Seibel & Morton, supra note 4, at 413. State bar associations were
responding to The Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, Legal
Education and Professional Development - An Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. ON
LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR. Because this report is commonly referred to as the
"MacCrate Report," after the task force chairperson Robert MacCrate, it will be referred to here-
inafter in this article as the "MacCrate Report."
10 ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 302(c)(1) (2002).
1" Id. § 302(c)(2).
12 MacCrate, supra note 9, at 1131.
13 Jay M. Feinman, The Future History of Legal Education, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 475, 480 (1998);
MacCrate, supra note 9, at 1131; MacCrate Report, supra note 9, at 235, 330.
14 MacCrate Report, supra note 9, at 235-36, 330-34.
15 See MacCrate, supra note 9, at 1131. The MacCrate Report is regarded by some as a "land-
mark," C. Michael Bryce & Robert F. Seibel, Trends in Clinical Legal Education, N.Y. ST. B.J.,
June 1998, at 26, 27, and a "defining moment." Feinman, supra note 13, at 480. For a more re-
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The shift away from paid summer clerkships or part-time jobs as the
only practical legal experience students gain during law school has also oc-
cuffed because law schools recognize that practical, legal experience, overseen
by a faculty mentor, helps law school graduates to be better lawyers from the
outset of their careers and beyond because hands-on training can meet many
student needs more ably than classroom instruction.16 Certainly, the key lawyer-
ing skills identified in the MacCrate Report are best served in a real-life context
that lets externs both observe the skills in action and practice those skills them-
selves. 17 For example, externships can provide intensive research, writing, and
analytic problem-solving in a whole-case context. 18 The field placement also
helps students to develop personal standards of professional conduct as they
observe and reflect upon the professional conduct of the attorneys at the extern-
ship site and confront ethical and professional-values questions of their own.19
Properly guided, the externship teaches students to reflect upon their skills,
choices, and values and helps them to become reflective lawyers responsible for
their professional growth.2°
The externship further enhances professional development by allowing
students to experience career possibilities and develop professional contacts
while still in law school. 21 Indeed, the career-shopping aspect of the extemship
may benefit the community as a whole, as students who might not otherwise
have chosen a public-service or government career follow those paths as a result
of their extership experiences. Even if students do not choose public-service
or government careers, these agencies benefit from free student labor during the
extership because ABA regulations do not permit students to be paid for work
they perform for academic credit.23
served analysis of the initial impact and continuing significance of the report, see generally Rus-
sell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Its Impact and Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to
Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 109 (2001).
16 See Seibel & Morton, supra note 4, at 413-14; see also William Wesley Patton, Creating an
Externship Consortium: The GLACE Experience, 4 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 233,
242-49 (2001).
17 See Liz Ryan Cole, Lessons from a Semester in Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 173, 175
(1994).
18 See id.
19 See generally Marty Geer, Law School Externships: Building Another Bridge over Troubled
Waters, NEV. LAW., May 2002, at 15; Lisa G. Lerman, Professional and Ethical Issues in Legal
Externships: Fostering Commitment to Public Service, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2295 (1999).
20 See J.P. OGILVY, ET AL., LEARNING FROM PRACTICE: A PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT TEXT
FOR LEGAL ExTERNs 1-2 (1998); Lerman, supra note 19, at 2296-97; Seibel & Morton, supra note
4, at 419-20.
21 See OGILVY, ET AL., supra note 20, at 1-2; Lerman, supra note 19, at 2295, 2297.
22 Lerman, supra note 19, at 2297.
23 Id. at 2295 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 306(a) interpreta-
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Another educational advantage is that the externship can supplement the
law school curriculum, not only by exposing students to legal subjects not found
in the course catalogue, but also by improving their understanding and retention
of subjects they have studied in law school and deepening students' expertise in
these areas through a more nuanced, detailed look in a whole-case context.24
Allowing students to gain substantive knowledge through externships is an ad-
vantage to the law schools as well because providing enough faculty to address
the wide range of subjects that interest students entering an ever more special-
ized legal profession may not be economically possible, nor would staffing clin-
ics in every area of student interest.
25
In some instances, externships can be more valuable than course work
because, as adult learners, law students benefit from the hands-on, experiential
learning provided in the extemship setting.26  Adults learn better by using
knowledge and practicing skills in the settings in which the knowledge and
skills are meant to be used.27 Adults prefer to learn and will learn more success-
fully when they are active participants involved in planning their learning, rather
than passive participants following the educational goals set by someone else.28
The externship helps to prepare the whole lawyer who works and lives
in the real world outside the classroom - a lawyer who must be attentive to and
serve client needs, wrestle with ethical issues, manage her time, reconcile the
practice of law with her personal values, wangle input from a distant boss or
appease an overbearing one, keep the secretaries in her camp, serve the commu-
nity, and build professional relationships. With the aid of a faculty mentor and a
field supervisor, the extern can make her first mistakes in a more supportive
environment, begin taking intelligent steps in the career-long process of han-
dling these challenges, and walk into that first job as a more competent and con-
fident lawyer.
B. Potential Dangers in Legal Externships
Working for lawyers and judges to earn course credit exposes law stu-
dents to the dangers that lawyers and judges face, and the profession daily
places lawyers in emotionally charged conflict situations that can fuel vio-
tion 1 (1979)); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS interpretation 305-2
(2002); OGILVY, ET AL., supra note 20, at 2.
24 Cole, supra note 17, at 175.
25 Seibel & Morton, supra note 4, at 420-21.
26 See OGILVY, ET AL., supra note 20, at 3; Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Lawyer as Teacher: The
Role of Education in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 359, 373-75 (1998); see also Cole, supra
note 17, at 177-78; Seibel & Morton, supra note 4, at 418-19.
27 See OGILVY, ET AL., supra note 20, at 8; Kovach, supra note 26, at 374.
28 See OGILVY, ET AL., supra note 20, at 7-9; Kovach, supra note 26, at 374.
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lence.29 Violence against attorneys has been on the rise since the 1980s, 30 and in
the current climate of hostility towards the law and legal authority, angry liti-
gants may attack opposing counsel, representing counsel, or the presiding
judge.3' Most attacks against attorneys occur in the courtroom during trials and
in legal offices, but violence against lawyers also occurs outside the workplace,
in parking lots, and at home.32 After all, an attorney's work place is not just the
office. Lawyers travel to investigate facts, meet with clients, and take deposi-
tions. They can be victims of violence at any place and any time. 33 Externs
could become targets of violent anger because of their own involvement in cases
or be harmed because they are with attorneys or judges who are attacked.
Some practice areas are more dangerous for lawyers than others. Fam-
ily law, because of the intense, hostile emotions involved in custody and support
issues, 34 is one of the most dangerous fields,35 as evidenced by a 1997 survey of
members of the ABA Section of Family Law. Twelve percent of the respon-
dents had at least once been victims of violence by an opposing party or a client,
and sixty percent had been threatened by an opposing party and seventeen per-
cent by their own clients. 36 News accounts bring these statistics to life: a law-
yer stabbed in the arm by his client's former husband after a custody case;
37
another divorce attorney shot and killed by his client's former husband, a gradu-
ate student;38 a judge shot to death after an alimony hearing. 39 Another high risk
29 See Stephen Kelson, An Increasingly Violent Profession, UTAH ST. B.J., March 2001, at 8,
8-9.
30 Id. at 8.
31 See Harold J. Bursztajn & James T. Hilliard, Ask the Expert-Violence Against Attorneys
and Judges: Protecting Yourself Before and After a Threat, at http://www.forensic-
psych.com/articles/artAskexp06.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2003).
32 See Stephen Kelson, Violence Against Lawyers, 23 LEGAL PROF. 197, 200 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Violence Against Lawyers]; Kelson, supra note 29, at 6.
33 See Violence Against Lawyers, supra note 29, at 4.
34 See Bursztajn & Hilliard, supra note 31, at 2.
35 See id.; Kelson, supra note 32, at 197. When I practiced law in central Illinois, my local
courthouse searched entrants only on the days of major murder trials, and the attorneys could
frequently be heard joking about this because everyone knew that the courthouse was a much
more dangerous place on the day of a divorce or custody hearing.
36 Kelson, supra note 29, at 2.
37 See id. (citing Husband Charged in Court Stabbing, VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 30, 1990, at
B4).
38 See Violence Against Lawyers, supra note 32, at 200 (citing Man Kills Former Wife's Law-
yer, then Himself, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 1995, at 6).
39 See Kelson, supra note 29, at 4 (citing Panhandle Mourns 3 Slain in Courthouse, MIAMI
HERALD, Jul. 30, 1987).
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practice area, for lawyers and judges, is criminal law. 40 For example, the defen-
dant in a sexual assault case tried to hire someone to kill the victim and his at-
torney.41 A man awaiting charges of stock fraud conspired to murder the judge
who had refused his bail.4 2 An attorney who handled child murder and civil
rights cases was murdered as he walked to court.43
In addition to high-risk cases, there are high risk clients, who can be
triggered into violence by certain volatile situations, such as losing cases they
expected to win or by falling behind in legal fees but feeling entitled to contin-
ued legal services. 44 The workers' compensation claimant who killed his lawyer
and held fourteen people hostage before killing himself,45 the man frustrated by
a bank account and property dispute who began shooting in a law office,46 and
the client who shot and killed a lawyer over a billing dispute 47 may have been
such high-risk clients.
The dangerous client could be more dangerous to a law student not ex-
perienced in client management than to an experienced lawyer. The younger,
traditional law student, who enters the J.D. program fresh from undergraduate
school, may be a chronological adult but lack the experience to recognize and
read risky situations. Yale Law School students representing a client who had
40 Id. at 4; see also Bursztajn & Hilliard, supra note 31, at 2.
41 Violence Against Lawyers, supra note 32, at 200 (citing Man Accused of Plot to Kill Victim,
Lawyer, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 20, 1992, at A8).
42 Kelson, supra note 29, at 9 (citing Man in Stock Fraud Case is Charged with Plotting to
Kill Judge Who Raised His Bail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000).
43 Id. at 4 (citing Arrest Made in Lawyer Shooting, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 6, 2000, avail-
able at www.abqtrib.com/archives/news00/030700_vigil.shtml).
44 Bursztajn & Hilliard, supra note 31, at 3. According to a clinical psychiatrist who consults
to attorneys nationally:
Certain explosive situations can compound the risk associated with a high-risk
case and/or client. Some examples are: (1) A client feels victimized by soci-
ety. (2) A client sees any authority (including government and the law) as the
enemy. (3) A client falls behind in paying legal fees, but still feels entitled to
an attorney's services. (4) A client has been inadequately prepared for the
traumatic aspects of litigation. (5) A client loses a case he or she expected to
win. (6) A client wins the case, but legal vindication does not bring the psy-
chological resolution the client desired. (7) When a legal impasse is reached,
the attorney offers to withdraw. The client, feeling abandoned and helpless,
becomes enraged.
Id.
45 See Violence Against Lawyers, supra note 32, at 200 (citing Claimant Kills Lawyer, Self
After Standoff, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1996, at 14).
46 See id. (citing Neil Steinber, Man Charged in 2 Slayings at Loop Office, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Feb. 28, 1994, at 11).
47 See id. (citing William Recktenwald, Lawyer is Slain in Loop Office: Shooting Follows
Dispute over Bill, CHI. TRIB., April 30, 1996, at 1).
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stolen to support her cocaine habit befriended her by "driving her to court ap-
pearances, arranging for her to enter an inpatient drug treatment program and
driving her there, and listening to and counseling her at all hours of the day and
night, and on weekends. 48 The clinical instructors encouraged the students to
believe that representing the client "meant offering personal and logistical sup-
port that might help her stay out of prison and regain custody of her children. '49
Yale students, representing homeless people threatened with expulsion from the
New Haven train station, helped their clients confront the police by spending the
night in the station with them. 50 Undoubtedly, the students learned important
lessons about compassion and their clients' real needs, yet either of the situa-
tions, with students' very personal involvement in potentially volatile events,
could have ended with physical injury to the students.
Sadly, the field supervisors themselves could pose the threat. Sexual
harassment has been called the "dirty little secret" of the legal profession. 51 A
1989 survey found that more than sixty percent of women lawyers had experi-
enced unwelcome sexual conduct, ranging from teasing to attempted or actual
52
rape on the job. The student extern is likely to be more vulnerable to sexual
harassment than a female attorney. Studies show that from thirty percent to
seventy percent of women in higher education are victims of sexual harass-
ment,53 and the particularly vulnerable groups include graduate students and
female students in male-dominated fields. 54 Field supervisors can prey on ex-
terns who do not want to jeopardize the career benefits or academic credit that
the externship provides.55
48 Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 335 (2001).
49 Id. This example is from an in-house clinic and not an off-site externship, but it illustrates
the kinds of situations that students may find themselves in as they leave the classroom and begin
acting like lawyers.
50 Id.
51 Stephanie Benson Goldberg, Law's 'Dirty Little Secret', A.B.A. J., Oct. 1990, at 34.
52 Deborah K. Holmes, Structural Causes of Dissatisfaction Among Large-Firm Attorneys: A
Feminist Perspective, 12 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 22 (1990). The survey was conducted by West
Publishing and the National Law Journal. Id.
53 Cynthia Grant Bowman & Mary Beth Lipp, Legal Limbo of the Student Intern: The Respon-
sibility of Colleges and Universities to Protect Student Interns Against Sexual Harassment, 23
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 95 (2000).
54 Id. at 104, & n.26. The other highly vulnerable women are women of color, students in
small departments or colleges, and economically disadvantaged students. Id.
55 Id. at 37-38. Harrington v. Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education,
714 So. 2d 845 (La. App. Ct. 1998), illustrates the most severe potential danger in placing students
under the supervision of instructors in the field. In that case, the director of a community college
culinary program, who performed half his work in the field, raped his twenty-year-old teaching
assistant at the end of a working evening in which she had assisted him with a wine tasting and
joined him in meeting restaurant owners and chefs. Id. at 847-48.
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Finally, it is possible that the student, like the plaintiff in Nova South-
eastern v. Gross,5 6 could serve the extemship in a dangerous neighborhood. The
law student could work, for example, at a legal aid office located in an area con-
venient for low-income clients but more dangerous than the law firm in a
neighborhood full of law firms. The extern could also be sent to a dangerous
neighborhood to interview clients or witnesses or to view an accident scene.
Unlike the summer clerkship, the externship is overseen by a faculty
member,57 and the student pays tuition and receives academic credit.58 The po-
tential dangers to externs are, therefore, dangers in a curricular activity, and that
distinguishing fact raises the question of the law school's responsibility for the
safety of externs.
III. THE DUTY ANALYSIS IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS BY STUDENTS AGAINST
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
The question of what duties law schools owe extems is a subset of the
broader, unsettled question of what duties colleges and universities owe their
students. Understanding the current, relevant case law requires a grasp not only
of general duty concepts but also of how judicial application of those concepts
to university law has evolved over the past few decades. To that end, Section A
explains why duty is the central issue in college students' negligence suits
against their schools but has only relatively recently become the gate-keeping
issue. Section B then reviews key duty concepts necessary to understanding the
history and present state of students' injury cases. In Section C, early, influen-
tial no-duty cases are placed in their proper context as judicial attempts to per-
petuate fallen immunities and protective tort doctrines. Finally, the trend away
from these cases towards greater judicial willingness to impose duties of care
upon colleges and universities is considered in Section D.
A. The Centrality of Duty
If a law student injured in the course of an externship sues her law
school for negligence, she will have to prove that the law school owed her a
duty of care and breached that duty, thereby actually and proximately causing
her harm.59 In addition, she will face defenses based on her own assumption of
the risk or contributory fault.60 The past few decades of university law have
demonstrated that among all these issues, the central battle of the litigation will
56 758 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2000).
57 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
58 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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be the question of whether the law school owed the student extem a duty of
care.
61
Colleges and universities fight hard on the duty issue because it is the
most useful tool for defeating liability. 62 Duty is an issue of law for the court;
63
therefore, a conclusion that the school owed the student no duty ends the lawsuit
before a jury can evaluate the reasonableness of the school's conduct.64 No duty
means no more negotiations, no more discovery and investigation, no settle-
ment, and no financial liability.65 When a court determines that the school owed
the student a duty of care, the case continues with further negotiations, further
investigation and preparation, and further hearings. 66 Even if the school be-
lieves that it has a good argument that it acted reasonably, that the causal link is
too tenuous, that the student failed to exercise reasonable care for her own safety
or assumed the risk that befell her, these issues will be determined by a jury,
which is a more costly, more time-consuming, and more uncertain process.
Once a duty is found, the school that believes it has a good case may settle any-
way.
67
Therefore, duty is the key question, but the law is not fully settled on
what duties colleges and universities owe their students because duty did not
become the focus of litigation between students and their college and universi-
ties until the 1970s. From the beginning of American history until the early
1960s, colleges and universities had almost no liability for student claims based
on safety or discipline because institutions of higher learning were shielded by
immunities and other protective tort doctrines, such as in loco parentis, proxi-
mate cause, contributory negligence, and assumption of the risk.68 Student dis-
61 See ROBERT D. BICKEL & PETER F. LAKE, THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
MODERN UNIVERSITY: WHO ASSUMES THE RISKS OF COLLEGE LIFE? 10-11, 67 (1999). This book
is a must-read for anyone interested in how courts have approached the duty question when stu-
dents sue their colleges and universities.
62 See id. at 67, 76.
63 Id.; 1 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 270.
64 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 6 1, at 96.
65 Id. at 67, 96.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 67, 90.
68 Peter F. Lake, The Rise of Duty and the Fall of In Loco Parentis and Other Protective Tort
Doctrines in Higher Education, 64 Mo. L. REV. 1, 1-9 (1999). Although there never was a uni-
versity immunity, a de facto immunity arose by courts' analogizing universities to other groups
such as parents, charities, government, and social hosts, which did enjoy substantial immunities.
Id. at 4. A particularly strong shield for institutions of higher education was in loco parentis.
Parents sent their "children" off to college, and the colleges and universities stepped into the par-
ents' almost complete tort immunity. Their in loco parentis role shielded colleges and universities
from student claims based on regulations or discipline. Id. at 4-6; see also BICKEL & LAKE, supra
note 61, at 23-25, 29.
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putes were usually handled quietly between the student and the school. The
legal system was not involved.69
Universities began to lose their legal insularity in the 1960s. First, a se-
ries of cases recognized students as constitutional adults entitled to minimum
constitutional rights in their interactions with their schools.70 These rulings ul-
timately toppled the doctrine of in loco parentis, which had placed colleges in
an authoritarian, controlling position over students and had shielded them from
law suits regarding student discipline and regulation.7  During the mid-70s to
mid-80s, several significant trends even further diminished the protection from
liability that colleges and universities had enjoyed: the adoption of comparative
fault, the relaxation of proximate causation rules to require guarding against
foreseeable third party misconduct - even criminal misconduct, and the col-
lapse of traditional charitable and governmental immunities. 72 When the tradi-
tional shields had fallen, duty became the gate-keeping issue that controlled
whether colleges and universities were liable for injuries to students.73
B. The Duty Concept
The careless defendant who injured the plaintiff will not be liable for the
injury if the court determines that the defendant had no legal obligation to the
plaintiff to act carefully. That legal obligation to exercise care is termed a
"duty," and duty is the first element of a negligence cause of action. 74 The ques-
tion for the court is whether the plaintiff was entitled to protection,75 and in most
cases the answer is simple, so simple that it is not even contested. As a general
rule, whenever it is foreseeable that a failure to use reasonable care would un-
reasonably risk harm to others or their property, the defendant is legally obli-
76gated to use reasonable care - he has a duty. Drivers must drive carefully
because, if they do not, their passengers, other drivers and their passengers, or
pedestrians could be hurt. The driver who is sued for mowing down a jogger
69 See BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 17-18.
70 Lake, supra note 68, at 3. The first such decision was Dixon v. Alabama, 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir. 1961), in which black students were perfunctorily dismissed from a public university on
vague terms but presumably because they participated in civil rights demonstrations. The Fifth
Circuit found that the students were constitutional adults with basic constitutional rights of fair
play and process, which the college could not deny. Id. at 158-159; see also BICKEL & LAKE,
supra note 61, at 39-43.
71 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 29-30, 42.
72 Lake, supra note 68, at 11.
73 Id.
74 1 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 269-70.
75 See id. at 582.
76 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 71; 1 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 578.
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will not bother to contend that he had no duty of care because the existence of
his duty is clear.
Not all cases are so simple. The general principle requiring us all to act
carefully to avoid foreseeable injury to others is riddled with exceptions,77 and
when sued by their students, colleges and universities almost always invoke the
exceptions related to affirmative duties.78  The school will characterize the
plaintiffs theory of negligence as nonfeasance, a claim based on the defendant's
pure failure to act for the plaintiffs benefit when the defendant was not the
source of the danger.79 The fact that care may have been easily provided and
that harm was foreseeable if care was not provided is not a sufficient basis for
imposing a duty in a nonfeasance case.80 A court will not impose an affirmative
duty to act unless the plaintiff proves that the defendant stood in a special rela-
tionship with her or voluntarily assumed a duty to act with care.8' Therefore,
the injured student will likely face a motion for dismissal or summary judgment
based on rules of "no duty to protect," "no duty to rescue," or "no duty to con-
trol the conduct of third parties," all subsets of the affirmative duty rule.
82
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, special relationships
that impose an affirmative duty of protection, rescue, or control include the rela-
tionships between a common carrier and its passengers, an innkeeper and its
guests, a possessor of land held open to the public and the entering public, and a
custodian and ward. A Caveat in the Restatement leaves open the possibility
77 1 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 578-79; CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS
ON TORTS 126-142 (2d ed. 1980).
78 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 76-78.
79 2 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 853, 855-56. When a driver fails to stop at a stop sign and hits a
jogger, failing to brake is not a pure failure to act. The driver acts by driving-the act of driving
is the potential source of danger-and the driver must engage in that act with care. But if the
driver had been sitting at a stop sign and had seen another car backing out of a driveway into the
path of an oncoming jogger, he would have had no obligation to try to prevent the other car from
hitting the jogger. His own driving did not present a danger to the jogger. Someone else's driving
did. This driver is guilty only of nonfeasance, a failure to take affirmative action that might have
helped the plaintiff, and the law does not impose affirmative duties to act, absent a special rela-
tionship or an assumption of the duty. A suit against this driver would fail for a lack of duty.
90 According to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965), "[t]he fact that the actor
realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another!s aid or protection does
not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." The origin of this rule lies in the early
common law distinction between "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance." Id. § 314 cmt. c.
81 2 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 853; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 314A, 315,
323. There are other exceptions to the no affirmative duty rules, see generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314-328 (setting forth the duties of affirmative action), but these are the
most relevant to the question at hand.
82 See DOBBS, supra note 59, at 853-54, 874-75; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314,
315; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS §§ 11.2, 11.5 (1999).
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(A).
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of other relationships that might impose a similar duty, 84 and case law in some
states has expanded the list to include the relationship between primary and sec-
ondary schools and their students, 85 but courts have declined to find the relation-
ship between college and student to be per se special.86 Courts will expand the
list of accepted special relationships to
a limited group of relations, in which custom, public sentiment
and views of social policy have led the courts to find a duty of
affirmative action. In such relationships the plaintiff is typically
in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the
defendant who, correspondingly, holds considerable power over
the plaintiffs welfare. In addition, such relations have often in-
volved some existing or potential economic advantage to the
defendant. Fairness in such cases thus may require the defen-
dant to use his power to help the plaintiff based upon the plain-
tiff's expectation of protection, which itself may be based upon
the defendant's expectation of financial gain.87
A plaintiff may also seek to overcome the "no duty to act" argument by
proving that the defendant voluntarily assumed a duty to her, either by begin-
ning performance of an act or by making a promise to act that demonstrated
assumption of the duty.88 The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes an
affirmative duty when the defendant "undertakes, gratuitously or for considera-
tion, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of the other's person or things ... if . . . his failure to exercise
such care increases the risk of such harm, or ... the harm is suffered because of
84 Id. § 314(A) caveat.
85 See infra notes 127 and 147 and accompanying text. For example, if the jogger in note 79
supra had been a high school student on a cross-country team, and the defendant driver was his
coach observing a practice run, then, where it is recognized, the special relationship between high
school student and teacher would impose a duty. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 858; see also
Dailey v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 470 P.2d 360, 363-64 (Cal. 1970). For a case declining to hold
even the junior high or high school relationship special, see Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 704 N.E.
2d 1147 (Mass. 1998). Case law has also expanded the list to include spouses, parents and chil-
dren, and employers and employees. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 876.
86 See infra notes 127-130, 148, and 172-73 and accompanying text.
87 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 374 (1984).
88 2 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 854-55. This can also be thought of as a way of making the
relationship special. Id. at 860; see also MoRRIS & MORRIS, supra note 77, at 128, 131. If the
driver in note 79 supra had told the jogger that he would follow along in his car to alert him to
hazards by honking but then became absorbed in a cell phone conversation and did not watch out
for hazards, a court might find that by making the promise, getting in his car, and following along,
the driver had assumed a duty of care to the jogger.
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the other's reliance upon the undertaking." 89 So, in addition to proving that the
defendant began performance or promised to act, the plaintiff must show either
that the defendant's negligence increased the risk of the personal injury or prop-
erty damage suffered or that such harm was suffered in reliance upon defen-
dant's performance. 90 The Restatement leaves open whether a defendant's mere
promise, without starting any performance, is a sufficient undertaking to impose
an affirmative duty,91 but the comments note that in cases where the plaintiff has
been injured by relying upon the promise, courts tend to seek ways to character-
ize the defendant's conduct as having entered into performance.92 Professor
Dobbs observes that courts "are entirely willing to impose liability for negligent
nonperformance of a safety promise."
93
The defendant who has voluntarily assumed a duty may be held liable
for negligent performance of the undertaking, failure to exercise reasonable care
to complete the undertaking, or failure to exercise reasonable care to protect the
other after discontinuing the undertaking. 94 The defendant's liability will be
limited to the scope of the risk that the defendant's negligence created and to the
harms that the undertaking was meant or reasonably expected to prevent.
95
It seems, then, that whether the injured student can establish that the
college owed her a duty will turn on whether the court characterizes the case as
one of misfeasance or nonfeasance, and if it finds nonfeasance, on whether it
characterizes the relationship as special or the school's conduct or promises as
assuming a duty that it did not otherwise have. These inquiries, however, may
not always resolve the question. In negligence law, the court considers public
policy under the duty issue, and in a particular case a court may find that social
policy, the interests of justice, or the parties' own competing interests support or
preclude a duty.96 Many courts, deciding the duty issue, will apply a policy fac-tor analysis that considers some or all of the following:
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 323 (1965).
90 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 861.
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 caveat & cmt. d. In the early development of tort
law, mere failure to perform a promise, contrasted with actually entering into performance and
performing carelessly, was regarded as nonfeasance, and action lay upon the contract and not tort
principles. Id § 323 cmt. d.
92 Id. cmt. d.
93 2 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 872.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 861-62. Suppose the driver in note 79 supra told the jogger that he would drive ahead
of him to shield him from oncoming traffic and did so, but the jogger was injured by a branch that
fell from a tree. If the jogger sued the driver, contending that he had assumed a duty to protect
him, the driver could successfully argue that falling tree limbs were outside the scope of the duty
that he had assumed.
96 1 id. at 582.
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1) foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
2) nature of the risk;
3) extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff;
4) degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury;
5) closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the plaintiff s injury;
6) moral blameworthiness and responsibility of the defendant;
7) burden on the defendant and larger community if a duty is
imposed;
8) social policy of preventing future harm (whether imposing a
duty will tend to deter harm);
9) availability, prevalence, and cost of insurance for the risk in-
volved; and/or
10) administrative factors, such as ease of administering a duty
rule.97
C. Shielding Colleges and Universities with No-Duty Rules
The loss of legal insularity that instated duty as the key issue in college
students' negligence suits against their schools98 did not create a new age of
liability. Courts still thought of colleges and universities as special places that
should be shielded from liability, and they used no-duty rules to accomplish a de
facto immunity. 99 Beginning in the mid-'70s and continuing into the 1980s,
courts generally characterized colleges and universities as bystanders to student
activity, helpless to control the drunken, stoned, sex-crazed, hippie, but constitu-
tionally adult, hordes who lived a spoiled, luxurious lifestyle on America's
campuses.1°° As bystanders, the schools had not acted; they had created no risk.
97 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 202; 1 DOBBS, supra note 59, at 582; see also Doe v.
Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d
334 (Cal. 1976); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
98 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
99 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 49.
100 Id. at 50; see infra notes 157-60, 173 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 106
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol106/iss1/5
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
Therefore, courts treated injured students' theories of university negligence as
premised on nonfeasance and requiring a special relationship before a duty
could be imposed.1 ' In looking for this special relationship, the courts consid-
ered only the traditional categories, despite the Restatement's openness to ex-
panding these categories. Of the traditional categories, the only one possibly
applicable was a custodial relationship.
10 2
On the custodial relationship issue, students' newly won constitutional
rights were used against them.10 3 Courts ruled that, as constitutional adults, stu-
dents could hardly be deemed in the custodial care of their schools. As adults,
students were responsible for their own safety, and colleges and universities
could not be expected to help them stay safe.1°4 Courts characterized even uni-
versity-sponsored activities as nonfeasance situations where no duty was owed
absent a special relationship involving custodial control, and, of course, now
that in loco parentis had fallen, the schools had no custodial control, no special
relationship, no duty, no liability. 10 5 Even when students contended that a duty
had been assumed, the courts rejected the argument on the ground that no custo-
dial obligation had been assumed and did not consider that lesser obligations
may have been undertaken and breached. 0 6 With a lack of judicial imagination,
nostalgic courts saw the lost right to exercise rigid, authoritarian control as the
only way to keep campuses safe.'0 7
1. Bradshaw v. Rawlings
Bradshaw v. Rawlings'0 8 is a highly influential 1979 opinion by the
Third Circuit. Many cases have seized its argument that the inability of the
modem American college to exercise custodial control over its students pre-
cludes finding a special relationship between student and university. The case is
also frequently relied upon to reject an argument that university rules devised to
101 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 49. Special relationships overcome this general rule
rejecting affirmative duties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 315 (1965); see infra
notes 121, 127-35, 146, 169-70 and accompanying text.
102 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A caveat; BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at
78; infra text accompanying notes 127-35, 150-52, 169-73.
103 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 78; see infra notes 122-26, 157-58, 172 and accompany-
ing text.
104 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 78; see infra text accompanying notes 122-24, 129, 172-
76, 189.
105 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 78; see infra text accompanying notes 121-35, 169-76.
106 See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
107 See infra notes 122-24, 157-58, 169-76 and accompanying text.
108 612 F.2d 135 (3rd Cir. 1979).
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promote student safety created an assumed duty to enforce those rules."°9 A
student at Delaware Valley College, Bradshaw had attended an annual sopho-
more class picnic, planned with the aid of a faculty supervisor, who co-signed
the check used to purchase approximately seven half-kegs of beer by the under-
age class president." ° Most of the sophomore class was under the state drinking
age, and university rules prohibited underage drinking, but the college duplicat-
ing center reproduced the beer-mug decorated flyers that the party organizers
posted throughout campus to advertise the picnic.' The college provided no
transportation, leaving the underage drinkers to find their own ways to and from
the off-campus grove where the party was held." 2 The faculty sponsor did not
attend the picnic or send anyone in his place who might have noticed that
Rawlings, the student who was Bradshaw's ride back to campus, had become
intoxicated. 1 3 On the drive home, Rawlings lost control of his car, and the re-
sulting accident rendered Bradshaw quadriplegic. 1
4
The district court, which found that the college owed Bradshaw a duty
of care and submitted the case to the jury, saw the college as an actor with
knowledge of the dangers it had created by helping to plan and promote a party
at which underage students would drink and then have to rely on private trans-
portation to return to campus." 5 To the district court, the case involved misfea-
sance, so that the duty question turned on whether an unreasonable risk of harm
was foreseeable if care was not exercised. 1 6 Under a duty, the college was re-
quired only to act reasonably, not to insure student safety."l 7 After the jury
found the college liable to Bradshaw, and the district court denied a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the college appealed, contending that
Bradshaw had failed to establish a duty of care."
8
Writing for the Third Circuit, Judge Aldisert saw the case quite differ-
ently from the district court and overturned its opinion based on three intertwin-
ing themes: (1) that the relationship of the modern university with its students
had changed radically, leaving the schools unable to exercise custodial control
109 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 57.





115 Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 464 F. Supp. 175, 180-81 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part by 612 F.2d 135.
116 Id. at 181.
117 Id.
118 Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 137-38.
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over students and keep them safe;" 9 (2) that imposing a duty would strap col-
leges with an impossible burden to fulfill, making them insurers of student
safety; 120 and (3) that the college had not created a risk, the students had, so that
the case was premised on nonfeasance and required a special custodial relation-
ship between student and university if a duty was to be imposed.' 2'
Regarding the first theme, Judge Aldisert explained that the relationship
between college and student had changed dramatically in recent years. When
institutions of higher learning were regarded as standing in loco parentis to their
students, who were considered minors entrusted to their care, the schools could
keep students safe by imposing and enforcing strict regulations on student con-
duct.122 Through the "campus revolutions of the late sixties and early seven-
ties," college students had "peaceably and otherwise" obtained greater rights,
privileges, and freedoms and ended the in loco parentis doctrine. 123 As constitu-
tional adults, freed from authoritarian university control, students had won the
right to regulate their own lives: they had greater privacy rights; more liberal,
even unlimited, visiting hours; and control over "the broad arena of general
morals.' 24 Strict regulation of student conduct was now constitutionally for-
bidden, and the students had wanted it that way. Unable to regulate student
conduct, the college was unable to control that conduct and therefore unable to
keep students safe.
This vision leads to the second theme - the equation of duty with li-
ability. To the Third Circuit, a university duty to the students meant liability.
The court declared that its "beginning point" in analyzing the case was "a rec-
ognition that the modem American college is not an insurer of the safety of its
students."'125 As the modern American college was now unable to sanction stu-
dents for misbehavior in their private lives, the court believed that the colleges
were now helpless to keep students safe. A duty requiring them to do so would
make them guarantors of student safety, liable whenever drunken students in-
jured themselves or others.126
119 Id. at 138-40.
120 Id. at 138, 142.
121 Id. at 141.
122 Id. at 139.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 139-40.
125 Id. at 138. Indeed, although this may be reading too much into imprecise writing, the Third
Circuit also broadly stated that the "major question" presented was "whether a college may be
subject to tort liability for injuries sustained by one of its students involved in an automobile acci-
dent when the driver of the car was a fellow student who had become intoxicated at a class pic-
nic," not narrowly as whether the college owed that student a duty. Id. at 136-37 (emphasis
added).
126 Id. at 138, 142.
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The third theme, that this was a case of nonfeasance, was never explic-
itly stated, but the court's search for duty in the law of special relationships and
the rhetoric employed throughout the opinion make clear that the court did not
see the university as the risk creator. As students, not the school, were the
source of danger, the school had to be in a special relationship with the student
to owe him a duty. That duty could be found if the court expanded the tradi-
tional categories of special relationships to include that of college and student,
just as the categories had been expanded to include the relationships between
educational institutions and primary and secondary students. 127 The court found,
however, that the momentous change in student rights and privileges precluded
such an expansion. Although broadening the categories to include relationships
between schools and elementary or secondary students was logical because
these relationships involved minor children and traditional, custodial responsi-
bilities, 28 the same logic did not apply to the relationship between college and
student. Judge Aldisert equated constitutional adult status with actual maturity
and the ability to make wise choices and so wrote that college students stood in
a different relationship with their schools because they had "reached the age of
majority and [were] capable of protecting their own self-interests.' 29 The rela-
tionship had once been special, before college students gained minimal constitu-
tional rights, but the source of the special relationship had been the fallen doc-
trine of in loco parentis.130 By seeking greater freedoms, students had lost the
custodial relationship that had been the source of a duty of care.
Although the Third Circuit declined to find the college and student rela-
tionship per se special, it considered whether the relationship between Bradshaw
and Delaware Valley College had become custodial and therefore special.' 3'
(The decision to analyze the problem in this manner seems to blur the concepts
of special relationship and voluntary assumption of a duty.) Bradshaw had ar-
gued that a duty arose from college rules prohibiting alcohol consumption by
any students, regardless of age.132 Because most students at the college would
be under the state drinking age, the Third Circuit saw the prohibition as merely
127 Id. at 140.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 138-39. In loco parentis, however, was never the source of a duty of care owed to
students. It was a doctrine that allowed colleges and universities to step into the almost complete
tort immunity enjoyed by parents and shielded them from suits based on regulation and discipline.
Theodore Stamatakos, Note, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability and the Student-
College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471, 482-83 (1990) cited with approval in Lake, supra note 68,
at 5.
131 Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 140-41. The court found the record "not overly generous in identify-
ing the interests possessed by the student." Id. Apparently, the student's interest in remaining
free from serious personal injury was not a significant interest.
132 Id. at 141.
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requiring students to obey state law, and such a requirement could hardly be
seen as a voluntary assumption of custodial responsibility. 33 Therefore, the
Third Circuit predicted "that the Pennsylvania courts would not hold that by
promulgating this regulation the college had voluntarily taken custody of Brad-
shaw so as to deprive him of his normal power of self-protection or to subject
him to association with persons likely to cause him harm."' 134 Without a custo-
dial relationship, the case was not submissible to the jury.135 The court did not
consider the possibility that a lesser responsibility than custodial care, the re-
sponsibility to exercise reasonable care to enforce the college safety rules, had
been assumed and breached. It was custodial care or nothing.
Bradshaw had also argued that the college owed him a duty to control
the conduct of his drunken friend or to protect him in transportation to and from
school activities since the college knew that students would drink beer at the
party in violation of its regulations and state law, thereby creating a foreseeable
risk to third parties. 36 Ridiculing Bradshaw's argument as centered on the idea
"that beer-drinking by underage college students, in itself, creates the special
relationship,"'1 37 Judge Aldisert refused to recognize the college as an actor that
had created any risks in this scenario. The court elaborated on "the fact that
beer drinking by college students is a common experience' 138 to two ends: (1)
that it is so common that it cannot really be regarded as the kind of harm-
producing event that triggers a duty and (2) that it is so common that to find a
duty would place "an impossible burden on the college.'1 39 Bradshaw's argu-
ments that a duty here would not impose an impossible burden were dismissed,
however, as blurring the duty and breach questions. 40
The three themes of Bradshaw rest on shaky foundations. First, grant-
ing students constitutional adult status is hardly the same as bestowing on them
the maturity and judgment to exercise reasonable care for themselves, especially
as many of them have just graduated from high school and are on their own for
the first time in their lives. Second, the case easily could have been viewed as
misfeasance, so that the plaintiff would not have had to play with the stacked
deck of a special relationship inquiry. As the district court saw it, this case in-




136 Id. at 141.
137 Id. at 142.
138 Id.
139 Id. The court also explained that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had rejected social host
liability for serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated guests and predicted that it would be even less
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and advertising that beer would be available. 14' The school was not a mere by-
stander; it actively made the drinking possible and then did nothing to prevent
the inevitable risk. This did not have to be a special relationship case at all.
Finally, imposition of a duty is not the same as imposition of liability,
which the district court also recognized. A duty of reasonable caie is not a duty
of insurance, a duty to pay for any student injury, but a duty to act towards stu-
dents with reasonable care and to compensate only those students injured be-
cause the college acted unreasonably. The "duty to protect" and "duty to con-
trol" are not duties to achieve protection and control but duties to act reasonably
towards those goals.
142
Reasonable care, by its nature, is never impossible because it calls only
for reasonable measures. Although stopping certain, individual students who
want to drink and drive from doing so may indeed be impossible, taking reason-
able steps to reduce the chances that other students will engage in this dangerous
behavior is rather easy. The faculty sponsor could have inquired how the check
was being spent and refused funds for alcohol. The faculty sponsor could have
reminded the underage class president that alcohol rules applied off-campus and
that student violators would be suspended. The faculty sponsor could have at-
tended the picnic or sent another responsible adult employee in his place. The
college could have refused to help advertise the picnic as a beer party. The col-
lege could have sent a van to shuttle students who drank too much. What the
court really seems to find impossible is not living up to a reasonable care stan-
dard but changing the behavior of immature, constitutionally adult students who
want to drink and behave recklessly, but whether one or all of these simple pre-
cautions would have prevented Bradshaw's friend from driving drunk or Brad-
shaw from riding along with him is a causation question, not a question of the
propriety of imposing a duty.
141 Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 464 F.Supp. 175, 180-81 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part by 612 F.2d 135.
142 The duties to take positive action imposed by common law are generally duties
to act with reasonable care in order to give to others the aid or protection which
the performance of the duty would afford them. The words "reasonable care"
are here used to denote that the actor is required to do that which a reasonable
man would believe to be necessary to afford the aid or protection to which the
other is entitled, but no more.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Topic 7, Scope Note (1965).
"Where the duty to rescue is required, it is agreed that it calls for nothing more than reason-
able care under the circumstances." KEETON ET AL., supra note 87, at 377. "In all such cases
where the duty [to control third persons] does exist, the obligation is not an absolute one to insure
the plaintiffs safety, but requires only that the defendant exercise reasonable care." Id. at 385.
"The defendant's relationship to the plaintiff has been recognized as a ground for requiring the
defendant to take affirmative acts of reasonable care in a substantial body of cases." 2 DOBBS,
supra note 59, at 875.
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2. The Bradshaw Line of Cases
From Bradshaw v. Rawlings came a line of cases characterizing the
conduct of colleges and universities as nonfeasance and holding that colleges no
longer in loco parentis to students were not in special relationships with them
and did not assume duties to enforce their own safety provisions. The student
plaintiff in Baldwin v. Zoradi143 was also a passenger in a car driven by an in-
toxicated student. In this case, the student driver had become drunk in the col-
lege dormitory and then raced other drunk students.' 44 The plaintiff contended
that her university was negligent in its knowing failure to enforce its own alco-
hol prohibitions and in particular in the blind eye that dorm assistants turned to
underage student drunkenness. 145 Explicitly finding this to be a case of nonfea-
sance, a California appellate court considered whether the relationship between
a college student and her university was a special relationship. 146 The court ac-
knowledged that elementary and high schools owed their students a duty of rule
enforcement and supervision because school children have not attained full ma-
turity and could not exercise the "'discretion, judgment, and concern for the
safety of themselves and others"' that fully mature people can 47 but declined,
because college students are adults, to find a similar obligation to college stu-
dents based solely on the educational relationship. 148 Yet later in the opinion,
considering the public policy implications of imposing a duty, the court declined
to find a duty in part because students had not fully matured and needed free-
dom to make mistakes and learn from them: "Only by giving them responsibili-
ties can students grow into responsible adulthood."' 149
The court also considered whether the student's relationship to the uni-
versity was one of such dependence that a special custodial duty was owed.150
The plaintiff had argued that the dormitory contract, which gave the university
the power to inspect the dorm and terminate the room license for reasons of
health, safety, or general welfare and prohibited alcohol use, created a special
relationship.' 5' The court rejected this argument because it was not apparent
143 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
144 Id. at 811.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 812.
147 Id. at 813 (quoting Dailey v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 470 P.2d 360, 364 (Cal. 1970)).
148 Id. at 815.
149 Id. at 818.
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that failure to enforce alcohol provisions would create an imminent danger to
students. 
52
The California appellate court was willing to look beyond the special re-
lationship question and engage in a policy factor analysis.'53 This still did not
produce, however, a finding of duty. 54 The court side-stepped the foreseeability
question as easily outweighed by other factors 55 and found that the facts did not
present a sufficiently close connection between the school's alleged negligence
and the speed contest. More importantly, the court found that the university was
not morally blameworthy in its nonfeasance. 156 Guided by Bradshaw, the court
explained that the university had lost its authoritarian control over students and
could not control student morals. 5 7 Feeling the sting of California student ac-
tivism, the court wrote, "Since the turbulent '60's, California colleges and uni-
versities have been in the forefront of extension of student rights with a con-
comitant withering of faculty and administrative omnipotence. Drug use has
proliferated."'158 To the court, the substance-abusing students were the parties
with low morals, and "college administrators no longer control the general area
of general morals."'159 In addition, and somewhat contradictorily, the failure to
enforce prohibitions against alcohol use was not morally blameworthy because
"the use of alcohol ... is not so unusual or heinous by contemporary standards
as to require special efforts... to stamp it out."'16 Concurring with Bradshaw,
the court found that the decision to reserve the right to enforce state drinking
laws did not impose a mandatory duty to do so.' 6'
Although the legislature had repeatedly demonstrated a policy against
drinking by minors, the policy factor of preventing future harm nonetheless
weighed against the student because legislative prohibitions focused on active
"giving" or "furnishing" of alcohol to minors and did not prohibit standing by as
minors drank. 162 Although the university did not stop student drinking, it also
did not induce or encourage it. Therefore, policy concerns about underage
drinking were not implicated. In addition, the court found that public policy
152 Id. at 815.
153 Id. at 816; see supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
154 Baldwin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
155 Id. at 815-16.
156 Id. at 816.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 817.
159 Id. at 816.
160 Id. at 817.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 817-18.
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favored leaving underage students to their own devices when it came to drinking
alcohol because "[o]nly by giving them responsibilities can students grow into
responsible adulthood."'
163
Overstating the demands of a duty of reasonable care, the court found
that the burden factor further weighed against finding a duty because "it would
be difficult so to police a modem university campus as to eradicate alcoholic
ingestion.'' 64 Although considerations of the certainty of plaintiff's injury and
the availability of insurance weighed in the student's favor, on balance, policy
considerations supported a no-duty finding.1
65
Building on Bradshaw and Baldwin, the Utah Supreme Court found in
Beach v. University of Utah,166 that the university owed no duty of care to an
underage student injured on a required biology field trip. 167 After the curricular
part of the day had ended, the plaintiff, along with her professor and other stu-
dents, attended a lamb roast. There she drank four or five glasses of alcohol,
and she continued to drink in the van driven back to the campsite by her profes-
sor. Her professor dropped her off, and on her way to her tent in the dark, the
student became disoriented and fell off a cliff.168 Although the case could easily
have been characterized as the misfeasance of a college professor enabling his
underage students to drink alcohol in violation of school rules and state law, the
Utah Supreme Court saw it as an affirmative duty case, in which Beach, the
injured student, was asking the university to "protect [her] from her own intoxi-
cation and disorientation on the night in question."'' 69 This required a special
relationship, the essence of which was dependence. 170 Among other unsuccess-
ful arguments, Beach contended that university regulations prohibiting alcohol
consumption by underage students created a special relationship,'17 but the
court, focused on whether the regulations made the relationship custodial, re-
fused to find a duty because college students, who could vote and be tried as
adults, were not juveniles. 172 "We do not believe that Beach should be viewed
163 Id. at 818.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 819.
166 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
167 Id. at 414.
168 Id. at 415.
169 Id. at 415-16.
170 Id. Beach's counsel had conceded at oral argument that the student-teacher relationship was
not enough to create a duty, and the court was unconvinced that a prior incident on a field trip
made Beach sufficiently different from other students to impose a duty of care for her based on
especial vulnerability. Id. at 416.
171 Id. at 417.
172 Id. at 418.
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as fragile and in need of protection simply because she had the luxury of attend-
ing an institution of higher education."'
173
Quoting Bradshaw, the court explained that it was particularly impor-
tant - even constitutionally required - to treat college students as adults, re-
sponsible for their own safety. Adding to the Bradshaw and Baldwin rhetoric,
the court explained that
colleges and universities are educational institutions, not custo-
dial. Their purpose is to educate in a manner which will assist
the graduate to perform well in the civic, community, family,
and professional positions he or she may undertake in the fu-
ture. It would be unrealistic to impose upon an institution of
higher education the additional role of custodian over its adult
students and to charge it with responsibility ...for assuring
their safety and the safety of others. Fulfilling this charge
would require the institution to babysit each student, a task be-
yond the resources of any school. But more importantly, such
measures would be inconsistent with the nature of the relation-
ship between the student and the institution, for it would pro-
duce a repressive and inhospitable environment, largely incon-
sistent with the objectives of a modem college education. 174
A "realistic assessment" of the relationship between parties precluded
the court from finding a special relationship. 175 The duty was incapable of per-
formance and at odds with the parties' relationship.
176
Cherie Rabel, the plaintiff in Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan University,177
was an Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU) student living on campus in a dor-
mitory. 178 Jack Wilk, also an IWU student, was a member of the Fiji fraternity,
which was holding a lengthy, boisterous, drunken, day-time party, when Wilk
summoned Rabel to the lobby of her dorm, grabbed her forcibly, threw her over
his shoulder, and ran outside to run a gauntlet of fraternity members who were
to hit him with bones as he passed. 179 Instead, Wilk fell, dropping Rabel and
causing her serious, permanent head injuries. 18  The trial court dismissed
173 Id.
174 Id. at 419 (internal citations omitted).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 418.
177 514 N.E.2d 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
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Rabel's law suit against IWU on the pleadings on the ground that IWU did not
owe Rabel a duty of care.
181
On appeal, Rabel pointed out that IWU had marketed itself as a reli-
gious school with a tradition of supervising and controlling student activities
and enforcing its rules prohibiting alcohol on campus.' 82 In reliance on the
promise of a safe learning environment, students enrolled and paid the expen-
sive IWU tuition.' 83 Rabel contended that the representations that IWU would
provide safety, the university rules that attempted to provide safety, and the
premium tuition charged for providing safety, imposed a duty on the university
to do what it said it would do. 184 That duty would be premised either on creat-
ing a special relationship or voluntarily assuming a duty. 185
The appellate court found that Illinois Wesleyan had not assumed a duty
because Rabel had not identified any other court that had found a college or
university had assumed a duty to provide a safe environment by promulgating
rules or handbooks suggesting that it would. 186 Illinois Wesleyan, on the other
hand, could point to Bradshaw and Baldwin for the principle that university
prohibitions of student drinking did not impose a duty on the school to put any
teeth into those prohibitions.' 87 The appellate court, therefore, was unimpressed
by Rabel's argument, despite the fact that it could be distinguished from the
arguments rejected in Bradshaw and Baldwin. Rabel did not merely argue that
because Illinois Wesleyan had the rules it must enforce them. She argued that
she had been enticed to the university by those regulations and the promise of
safety embodied in them and that Illinois Wesleyan took money that she paid
based on the regulations, and that was why Illinois Wesleyan was obligated to
enforce its own rules.
In addition, the appellate court found that the IWU handbook, rules, and
policies did not create a custodial relationship between the university and its
students. 88 In reaching this conclusion, the court was impressed by the rhetoric
from Bradshaw and Beach that suggested the impossibility of fulfilling a duty if
imposed:
The university's responsibility to its students, as an institution
of higher education, is to properly educate them. It would be
181 Id.
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unrealistic to impose upon a university the additional role of
custodian over its adult students and to charge it with the re-
sponsibility of assuring their safety and the safety of others. Im-
posing such a duty of protection would place the university in
the position of an insurer of the safety of its students.
189
3. Finding No Duty Without Relying on the Bradshaw Line
Other courts of this era rejected injured students' duty arguments with-
out relying on the Bradshaw line, as is seen, for example, in Eiseman v. State.
190
SUNY Buffalo admitted a conditionally released prisoner known to have a his-
tory of violence, drug abuse, and mental illness. 19' He murdered a male student
and raped and murdered a female student, whose estate sued the State, alleging
that the university was negligent in admitting the ex-felon and/or failing to re-
strict his activities in light of the risk that he posed. 192 The New York Court of
Appeals considered whether the admission of an ex-felon through a special pro-
gram imposed a duty despite the fact "that colleges today in general have no
duty to shield their students from the dangerous activity of other students.' 93
The court found "no justification" for imposing such a duty. 194 The court found
no compelling public policy reasons to support a duty and instead found com-
pelling reasons not to. Any duty of care for other SUNY Buffalo students
would affect the privacy rights of potentially dangerous students and impede the
rehabilitation and education of a former convict who had served his time and
been legally released into the community. 195
4. Continuing Impact of Post-Immunity Era
Cases of this era continue to be cited uncritically and with approval to-
day by some courts. 196 The attitude of this "bystander era"'197 made colleges and
189 Id.
190 511 N.E.2d 1128 (N.Y. 1987). This is just one example of cases that did not impose a duty
of care in the post-immunity era without turning to the Third Circuit's opinion in Bradshaw for
guidance. See, e.g., Donnell v. Cal. W. Sch. of Law, 246 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987).
191 Eiseman, 511 N.E.2d at 1130-32.
192 Id. at 1132.
193 Id. at 1136.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See, e.g., Ochoa v. Cal. State Univ., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Niles v.
Bd. of Regents, 473 S.E.2d 173, 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Robertson v. State ex rel Dep't of Plan-
ning & Control, 747 So. 2d. 1276, 1280, 1282 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
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universities more dangerous because administrations believed that if they did act
to protect students, they would be found to have assumed duties that they did
not otherwise have.' 98 Yet some courts in this era recognized that student rights
were not won at the price of student safety and did find a special relationship
between the university and the injured student. 99 These cases opened the way
to a more thoughtful duty analysis.
D. Courts Become More Open to Finding a Duty
1. Bucking the Bradshaw Trend: Mullins v. Pine Manor College
Not all courts ruling on the duties that colleges owed students in the
post-immunity days saw colleges as mere bystanders to student injury, obligated
to act only if the student could demonstrate a special, custodial relationship.
The counter-point to Bradshaw is Mullins v. Pine Manor College.200 In that
case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that the general rule that there is
no duty to protect others from the criminal or wrongful acts of third parties had
"little application" to the case of Lisa Mullins, a freshman abducted from her
dormitory at Pine Manor College and raped.20 1 The court explained that the
duty of Pine Manor College in that case had two possible sources in well-
established legal principles. First, duty can derive from "existing social values
and customs. '20 2 Colleges of ordinary prudence do take steps to protect resident
students from criminal acts.20 3 In fact, plaintiffs expert visited eighteen area
colleges, all of which took steps to provide adequate campus security. 2°4 There-
fore, the college community recognized an obligation to protect students from
criminal acts, and that recognition indicated "that the imposition of a duty of
care is firmly embedded in a community consensus. 205 The court pointed out
that the concentration of young people, especially young women, made cam-
puses ripe for criminal predators, and the college is better situated than students
to provide the necessary security against criminal harm.20 6
197 This descriptive label was coined by Professors Bickel and Lake. See BICKEL & LAKE,
supra note 61, at 49.
198 Id. at 133-35.
199 Id. at 92-98; see infra notes 200-16 and accompanying text.
200 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983).
201 Id. at 333-35.
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The Mullins analysis recognized the difference between being a consti-
tutional adult, entitled to vote and have privacy rights, and being a true adult,
able to act and choose with maturity, as well as the difference between a lack of
authority to police student morals and a lack of responsibility for student safety.
Some students may not have been exposed previously to living
in a residence hall or in a metropolitan area and may not be
fully conscious of the dangers that are present. Thus, the col-
lege must take the responsibility on itself if anything is to be
done at all.
Of course, changes in college life, reflected in the gen-
eral decline of the theory that a college stands in loco parentis to
its students, arguably cut against this view. The fact that a col-
lege need not police the morals of its resident students, how-
ever, does not entitle it to abandon any effort to ensure their
physical safety. Parents, students, and the general community
still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by colleges
themselves, that reasonable care will be exercised to protect
resident students from foreseeable harm.2°7
The court also found that the duty of care could be established by show-
ing that the college had voluntarily assumed it.208 Pine Manor College had un-
dertaken a duty to protect students from the criminal acts of third parties and it
had done so not gratuitously but had charged students tuition and a dormitory
fee. 209 "Adequate security is an indispensable part of the bundle of services
which colleges ... afford their students.,2 °10 For the voluntary undertaking ap-
proach to succeed, the plaintiff must show either that the undertaking increased
the risk to her or that she relied on the undertaking. 211 The court found it "quite
clear that students and their parents rely on colleges to exercise care to safe-
guard the well-being of students. 21 2 Prospective students care about campus
security, and those visiting Pine Manor would have noticed the fence, the
213guards, and other visible security steps. Indeed, the requirement that fresh-
men live in the dorm was a representation that the college could provide ade-
207 Id. at 335-36 (internal citations omitted).
208 Id. at 336.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 336; see supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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quately for their safety.21 4 Mullins had visited a number of colleges, and the
court determined that students and parents rely on colleges to protect students
from foreseeable harm.215 These two bases were sufficient to establish a duty of
colleges to use reasonable care to prevent students from being injured by acci-
216dental, negligent, and intentional acts of third parties.
2. Viewing the Relationship as More than Educational
By the mid-'80s a shift had begun; courts more and more frequently
217found that the university did owe the student a duty of care. Although courts
still required the student to prove a special relationship and still continued to
reject the relationship between a university and a student as special per se,
courts began to recognize that the school often stood in relationships to its stu-
dents other than the educational one and that these relationships were special.218
When the university ran a dormitory, it was a landlord, and the students were its
tenants, who were owed a duty of care in the area of residential/dormitory
safety.19 When the university took fees from students, it was a business, and
the students were its customers, who were owed reasonable care in those ser-
vices. 220 Duties were found for premises maintenance. The colleges and uni-
versities as businesses had to provide their customers, the students, "safe walk-
ways, proper lighting, and other aspects of reasonably safe premises., 22' When
214 Id. at 337 n. 11.
215 Id. at 336-37.
216 Id. at 337.
217 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 12-13.
218 Peter F. Lake, The Special Relationship(s) Between a College and a Student: Law and Pol-
icy Ramifications for the Post In Loco Parentis College, 37 IDAHo L. REv. 531, 535 (2001).
219 See BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 109-24. A good example of this line of cases is Nero
v. Kansas State University, 861 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1993). Shana Nero was raped in the lounge of her
co-ed dormitory by another student resident; the university had assigned him to live there although
it knew he had been accused of raping another student. Id. at 771-72. Although the court held
that the university-student relationship was not special in itself and did not create a duty to protect
students from other students or third parties, the court found that a special university-student rela-
tionship was not the only possible source of a university duty. Id. at 778. In this case, the univer-
sity acted as Nero's landlord and owed her the same duty of care for her protection that a private
landowner owed its tenants. Id. at 780. According to the court, if criminal conduct is reasonably
foreseeable and within the university's control, the university has a duty of reasonable care to
protect students against it. Id. Here, the university knew of the alleged prior rape, and when the
accused rapist enrolled in summer school, the university had the option to refuse to rent dorm
space to him. Id. By allowing him to live in the dorm, the university gave the plaintiff a false
sense of security. Id. She saw him as a fellow student and stayed alone with him, rather than
leaving as she likely would have had he been a stranger. Id.
220 See BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 179-81.
221 Lake, supra note 68, at 12.
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students worked on campus, the school was an employer.222 A duty of care was
even found off-campus, when a student was injured on a school-related canoe
trip.223 Moreover, when schools acted to protect students and created reliance,
they had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the endeavor that they started.224
Within the educational relationship, duties were found with regard to curricular
and co-curricular safety, in the conduct of classes and labs.225 The obligation to
provide curricular safety is not tied to exceptions to no affirmative duty rules
and does not require a special relationship because it is based on the duty to use
reasonable care in actions and activities.
In a "radical shift" from the insular university, courts found duties in the
full range of extra-curricular activities in which universities exercised more su-
pervision, direction, structure, and control.22 7 This did not mean that schools
would be liable, but it did mean that courts would at least consider that they
were subject to liability where previously they would not have been.228 The
willingness of courts to use a business analogy to find that the post-secondary
institution owed a duty and to find that a duty was voluntarily assumed is the
attitude change most important to the question of whether law schools owe ex-
terns a duty of care.
3. The Furek Turning Point - The University as a Business
The decision in Furek v. University of Delaware229 has been dubbed the
end of the bystander era230 because it repudiates the logic of the line of cases
that "seem to rely on the policy analysis set out in Bradshaw without consider-
ing the factual validity of its premises or the accuracy and consistency of its
logic."'231 Furek was a fraternity pledge who was permanently scarred when lye-based oven cleaner was poured on him as part of hazing. For years, the univer-
222 Id.
223 Mintz v. State, 362 N.Y.S.2d 619 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); see Lake, supra note 68, at 13.
224 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 129.
225 Id. at 150-52; see Delbridge v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 893 P.2d 55 (Ariz Ct.
App. 1995); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996); Fu v. State, 643 N.W.2d 659 (Neb. 2002). Duties in curricular activities are not new, al-
though older lawsuits regarding curricular duties are rare. BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 151;
see, e.g., Brigham Young Univ. v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1941); Grover v. San
Mateo Junior Coll. Dist., 303 P.2d 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
226 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 151.
227 Lake, supra note 68, at 13.
228 Id.
229 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991).
230 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 128-30.
231 Furek, 594 A.2d at 518.
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sity was aware that students were being injured in fraternity hazing, and for
232years the university issued statements prohibiting hazing. These pronounce-
ments were ineffectual, and hazing continued openly on campus, as the univer-
sity took no direct action to deal with the known hazing danger.233 No evidence
was presented that campus security had been instructed to investigate or take
action regarding hazing. In fact, the evidence showed that when officers wit-
nessed hazing they permitted it to continue.234
Furek won his negligence case with the jury, but the trial court granted
the university a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Furek had pre-
sented insufficient evidence to establish a special relationship supporting a duty
or the voluntary assumption of a duty to enforce the anti-hazing rules.235 Upon
Furek's appeal, the university asked the court to accept the Bradshaw logic that
the end of in loco parentis meant the end of any special relationship between
university and student that would require the university to protect the student.236
Recognizing that the scope of a duty of care often turns on the relation-
ship between the parties, the court chose to examine the relationship between
student and university for itself, rather than relying on the Third Circuit's de-
scription. In its more accurate assessment, the court wrote:
The university-student relationship is certainly unique. While
its primary function is to foster intellectual development
through an academic curriculum, the institution is involved in
all aspects of student life. Through its providing of food, hous-
ing, security, and a range of extracurricular activities, the mod-
em university provides a setting in which every aspect of stu-
dent life is, to some degree, university guided. This attempt at
control, however, is directed toward a group whose members
are adults in the contemplation of law and thus free agents in
many aspects of their lives and life styles. Despite the recogni-
tion of adulthood, universities continue to make an effort to
regulate student life and the courts have utilized diverse theories
in attempting to fix the extent of the university's residual
duty.237
The Furek court accepted the constitutional adulthood of college stu-
dents as relevant to the legal obligations arising from the relationship but did not
232 Id. at510-11.
233 Id. at 511.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 516.
236 Id. at 517.
237 Id. at 516.
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consider that adult status dispositive of the duty issue. The court rejected the
idea that "student and the university operate at arms-length, with the student
responsible for exercising judgment for his or her own protection when dealing
with other students or student groups. '238 Given the nature of the relationship,
the duty owed was limited, but a duty was owed.239 A key point here is that the
Delaware Supreme Court did not see duty in all or nothing terms as many previ-
ous courts had. The duty did not have to be custodial care or no care - it could
be limited as was appropriate in the particular case.
The court rejected the Bradshaw line of cases as utterly unsupported.
Those cases offered no empirical evidence that reduced supervision fostered
increased student maturity, and other than the assertions of the Bradshaw opin-
ion itself, the line relied upon no legal or other authority for the contention that
supervising potentially dangerous student activities would harm the college en-
vironment or be inconsistent with the goals of a college education. The court
found it equally likely that supervision, particularly where it promoted student
health and safety, was consistent with the parties' relationship.
Student activists in the 1960s had not protested and litigated for greater
rights to end university supervision of dangerous activities - to ensure the right
to have trampolines or haze fraternity pledges - but to end political and intel-
lectual coercion. 241 The court could not accept that this successful activism
meant students were no longer owed safety. In addition, the court pointed out a
logical flaw in the Beach and Bradshaw opinions. Both rejected a duty because
the students were adults, yet these were alcohol-related cases, and neither plain-
tiff was legally adult with regard to alcohol.242
The court observed that despite the fall of in loco parentis, some courts
had found colleges and universities to owe a duty to their students243 as the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court did in Mullins.244 Even though the relationship could
not be characterized as custodial and was not special per se, "where there is di-
rect university involvement in, and knowledge of, certain dangerous practices of
its students, the university cannot abandon its residual duty of control." 24
The source of the duty to Furek could be found in two places. First, the
university could be found to have voluntarily assumed a duty of protection as set
238 Id. at 517.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 518.
241 Id. at 158 n.ll.
242 Id. at 518.
243 Id. at 518-19.
244 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983); see supra Part II.D. 1.
245 Furek, 594 A.2d at 519-20.
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forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323.246 The university had an anti-
hazing policy and made repeated communications to students and fraternities
regarding the policy. "The University's policy against hazing, like its overall
commitment to provide security on campus, thus constituted an assumed duty
which became 'an indispensable part of the bundle of services which colleges..
.afford their students."'
247
In addition, a duty could be premised on Furek's business invitee status
248on university property. As a landowner with knowledge of an unreasonably
dangerous use of its property, the university had a duty to safeguard Furek
against the hazard, even though the hazard was the conduct of the third parties
who hazed him.249 The duty was not absolute but extended to foreseeable acts
of third parties subject to university control.250 Evidence of foreseeability could
be found in the defendant's past experience or the place or character of the busi-
ness.25' Also the property owner's attempts to provide security or regulate a
hazardous activity can demonstrate the foreseeability of the risk.25 2 That was
the case here. The university's own weak attempts to curb the hazards plus
known student injuries from hazing proved that such injuries were foresee-
able.253
As to the issue of control, the fraternity was on campus and subject to
25the university security department.  The university ban and its attempts to
bring disciplinary action against the fraternity after Furek's injury showed the
university's own belief that it had the authority to enforce its anti-hazing pol-
icy.255 The court stated that the necessary control to impose a duty did not have
to be absolute. "If control includes authority to direct, restrict and regulate, the
University with its significant involvement in the regulation of fraternity life,
particularly in the area of hazing, may be deemed to have exercised sugervision
over the use of its property to permit 'at least the inference of control.' 56
In summary, the court found that even without the in loco parentis rela-
tionship, "the relationship is sufficiently close and direct to impose a duty under
246 Id. at 520; see supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
247 Furek, 594 A.2d at 519-20 (quoting Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 336); see supra notes 200-16
and accompanying text.
248 Furek, 594 A.2d at 519-20.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 521.
251 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f. (1965)).
252 Id. at 521-22.
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Restatement § 3 14A.,,257 Although the university was "not an insurer of the
safety of its students nor a policeman of student morality, nonetheless it [had] a
duty to regulate and supervise foreseeable dangerous activities occurring on its
property. 258 The duty was not broad but limited to situations where the univer-
sity exercised control and was owed to students on the property for permitted
purposes.259
4. The University Assumes a Duty
Rejena Coghlan, the plaintiff in Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi FrateMity, 260
was an eighteen-year-old freshman at the University of Idaho. As a sorority
pledge at Alpha Phi Sorority, she was invited during Rush Week to two frater-
nity drinking parties, where she was served beer, whiskey, and mixed hard alco-
hol.26' Coghlan did not have identification, nor was she asked for it at either
party. 262 One party was attended by two Greek advisors employed by the uni-
versity, and one spoke to Coghlan.263 As a result of drinking at the fraternity
parties, Coghlan became intoxicated and distraught. A sorority sister escorted
her home and put her in bed. Later that night Coghlan fell from a fire escape
platform to the ground thirty feet below.26
The trial court dismissed Coghlan's negligence claim against the Uni-
versity, holding that it owed her no duty of care.265 On appeal, the Idaho Su-
preme Court concurred that no special relationship existed between Coghlan and
the university that would overcome the general rule that imposes "no affirmative
duty to act or assist or protect another., 266 The court "decline[d] to hold that
Idaho universities have the kind of special relationship creating a duty to aid or
protect adult students from the risks associated with the students' own voluntary
intoxication. 267 The court cited with approval cases that have declined to find a
special relationship between students and colleges because college students to-
day are regarded as adults, and college and universities no longer assume the
257 Id.; see supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
258 Furek, 594 A.2d at 522.
259 Id.
260 987 P.2d 300 (Idaho 1999).
261 Id. at 304-05.




266 Id. at 311.
267 Id. at 312.
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authoritarian, custodial role they played under the in loco parentis doctrine.268
The court agreed with the Third Circuit opinion in Bradshaw that "'the modem
American college is not an insurer of the safety of its students.'
269
Nonetheless, the court overruled the trial court's dismissal of the case.27°
Instead of finding a special relationship, the court determined that the pleadings
sufficiently stated a claim for relief because the facts provided an inference that
the university had assumed a duty.271 The court explained that a duty can be
created where one previously did not exist. "'If one voluntarily undertakes to
perform an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to perform the act
in a non-negligent manner. ' - 272 In this case, two university employees attended
the BTP party to supervise it. They knew or should have known that the frater-
nity was serving alcohol to underage students, and they knew or should have
known that Coghlan was drunk.2 73 Without concluding at this stage that a duty
had been assumed as a matter of law, the court held that it was error to dismiss
the case at that point in the proceedings because the allegations supported an
inference that the university had "assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to
safeguard the underage plaintiff from the criminal acts of third persons, i.e.,
furnishing alcohol to underage students, of which the university employees had
knowledge. ,
274
IV. DUTY ANALYSIS IN CASES MOST ANALOGOUS TO EXTERNSHIPS
A. Finding No Duty
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected a duty in an ex-
temship context in Judson v. Essex Agricultural & Technical Institute.2 75 As
part of her curriculum at Essex Agricultural and Technical Institute, Carol Ann
Judson was required to participate in employment related to her course work.276
268 Id. at 311-12.
269 Id. at 312 (quoting Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138 (3rd Cir. 1979)).
270 Id. at 310.
271 Id. at 312.
272 Id. (quoting Featherstone v. Allstate Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 937, 940 (Idaho 1994)).
273 Id.
274 Id. Similarly, the court did not find a special relationship between Coghlan and her sorority
but did find a material issue of fact as to whether the sorority "voluntarily assumed a duty of rea-
sonable care to supervise and protect Coghlan until she was out of danger of harm due to her
intoxication." Id. at 314. The sorority invited her to attend the fraternity parties, knew or should
have known that underage pledges would be served alcohol, and appointed a "guardian angel"
sorority member to accompany Coghlan. Id. at 305. In addition, the sorority returned the intoxi-
cated Coghlan to the sorority house and left her unattended. Id. at 314.
275 635 N.E.2d 1172 (Mass. 1994).
276 Id. at 1173.
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While fulfilling the requirement by working at Bradvue Farm, Judson fell from
a barn loft and was injured.277 She sued her vocational school for negligence in
failing to provide a reasonably safe workplace and failing to ensure that the farm
had workers' compensation insurance as it had represented to the school.278 The
trial court granted summary judgment to the vocational school. 279 The state
supreme court concurred and held that the school owed no duty to the student.28 °
The court declined to consider whether the vocational school owed
Judson a duty based on a special relationship, leaving Judson to rely on her al-
ternative theory that the placement agreement imposed a duty of care.28' That
agreement provided in part:
It is understood by the employer that the student's project in-
structor will visit or call the student on the job for the purpose
of consultation, to insure that both the employer and the student
get the most out of this situation. The instructor will show dis-
cretion in the time and the circumstances of these visits.
The employer is aware of, and agrees to abide by, labor and
wage laws as they may apply to this employment. This agree-
ment may be terminated by mutual agreement at any time by ei-
ther the cooperating employer or the school.282
The court rejected Judson's analogy to Mullins283 because no social val-
ues or customs demonstrated that vocational schools have recognized an obliga-
tion to protect students in their school-related employment with third parties that
would make students or their parents expect the school would exercise reason-
able care to inspect the workplace or ensure that the employer had workers'
compensation coverage for the student.284 Nor could the agreement be read to
create such a duty. It did not assure the student or represent to her that the
school would inspect the workplace to see that it was safe.285 Indeed, the




280 Id. at 1174-75.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 1173 (internal quotations omitted). The agreement also stated that the student must be
covered by workers' compensation insurance and that the employer had to indicate that the stu-
dent would be covered. Id.
283 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983); see supra notes 200-16 and accompanying text.
284 Judson, 635 N.E.2d at 1174.
285 Id. at 1175.
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plaintiffs employer" by requiring the farm "to abide by [] labor and wage laws
as they may apply to this employment., 286 The court observed that it was the
student's responsibility to find a job placement and that the agreement merely
indicated that calls or site visits would occur to ensure that both employer and
student would "get the most out of this situation.2 87 The school was not obli-
gated to ensure that the employer actually was insured. The statement in the
agreement mandating insurance served only as notice to the student and em-
ployer of the employer's responsibility to obtain insurance.288
B. Finding a Duty
Some cases have found a duty in situations analogous to the legal ex-
tern. In Silvers v. Associated Technical Institute, 289 a Massachusetts Superior
Court found that a post-secondary vocational school owed a duty of care to a
student who was referred by the school placement office to an employer who
hired her and then sexually harassed and assaulted her. The school touted its
placement services in promotional literature and mentioned them in its course
catalogue and enrollment agreement. The school also verbally notified the stu-
dent that it would attempt to put her in a job in her field.290 When the placement
office received a telephoned job order for a "Female tech for Communications
switching complex - a lot of travel - part-time," it sent the prospective em-
ployer the student's resume without first consulting her or making any investi-
gation of the employer.29' Minimal investigation would have revealed that the
employer, Winchester International Group, consisted of a husband and wife and
operated out of their home. In addition, just eight years before, the husband was
292convicted of indecent assault and battery. The student accepted an offer for
employment from Winchester International Group because she assumed that the
placement office "would only refer [her] name to legitimate employers which it
had screened., 293 She worked for Winchester for a month and a half, and in that
time her employer "sexually assaulted and harassed her, insisting that she share
a room with him on business trips, walking naked in her presence, touching her
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 1174-75.
289 No. 934253, 1994 WL 879600 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 1994). This is only a trial court
opinion, but it was cited by the Florida Supreme Court in Nova Southeastern University, Inc. v.
Gross, 758 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 2000), and demonstrates how the duty issue may play out in the
front lines.
290 Silvers, 1994 WL 87600, at *1.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id. at *2.
2003]
39
Butler: Shared Responsibility: The Duty to Legal Externs
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2003
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
against her will, and forcing her to have sexual intercourse," before firing her
for refusing to submit to his sexual demands.294
The student filed a negligence action against the vocational school,
which contended that it did not owe her a duty "to investigate the background of
every employee of every employer using its placement listings or to scrutinize
job orders for potential violations of employment law and ... that it could not
foresee criminal assaults by the employees of prospective employers. 295 Such a
duty, the school argued, would expose the school to suits for invasion of pri-
vacy, deter employers from using their services, and violate Commonwealth
policy of encouraging gender-neutral hiring.29 6
The court analyzed this as a case of contractual undertaking. By receiv-
ing the student's tuition payments, the school agreed to provide her a training
program and job placement assistance. The school thus committed itself to ex-
ercising due care in delivering those services.29 7 Recognizing that generally,
without a special relationship, there is no duty to protect people from the
wrongdoing of others, the court explained that, nonetheless, the primary test for
the existence of duty is whether the defendant should have "foreseen a reason-
able need for proactive intervention and - most important - a substantial risk
of harm to plaintiff from failure to act., 298 The court also stated that as the
harms a defendant may foresee change with "the evolving expectations of a ma-
turing society," the special relationships that trigger a duty to take affirmative
action with reasonable care also change. 299 The court concluded that students at
the vocational school would reasonably expect the placement office to take
some effort to avoid placing them with employers likely to harm them. 3°° In this
case, the court believed that the female-only job order should have prompted an
inquiry, particularly in light of statutes prohibiting sexual harassment in em-
301ployment. Imposing a duty on the placement service to exercise reasonable
care not to place students with employers who discriminate would foster state
policies against such discrimination.3 °2 The court described the duty as an
"[i]nquiry into the reasons that an employer has specifically requested a female
candidate," that did not need to be "intrusive" or "Orwellian" or cover every
294 Id. When the student, after her dismissal, reported the situation to the placement office, the
placement director took no action but said, "Too bad he wasn't younger and better looking." Id.
295 Id.
296 Id.





302 Id. at *4.
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employee of each prospective employer. °3 The court did not describe what con-
duct would satisfy the duty but stated that it "requires more than what defendant
did here. 3°4
In Harrington v. Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education,35 a Louisiana appellate court ruled that a community college owed
its students a duty of care in hiring an instructor for its culinary apprenticeship
program. 30 6 A twenty-year-old student at Delgado Community College, Kim-
berly Harrington volunteered to be a teaching assistant to John Veller, director
of the culinary program.30 7 In this position, Veller "screened and interviewed
applicants, placed students in hotels and restaurants as apprentices, and met with
chefs and owners, often during nighttime hours. 30 8 Half his work was in the
field.3° When Veller was hired, no one inquired about his past, verbally or on
his application form.310 Typically, the school checked teaching credentials and
nothing more.31' Veller had a criminal record, with convictions for possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute, theft, and interstate transportation of
forged securities. 312 In addition, he had used two aliases and had an outstanding
warrant for his arrest in Illinois.313 One night, after assisting Veller with a wine
tasting, Harrington went with him to meet chefs and restaurant owners. One
stop was at the home of a restaurant owner. When Veller and Harrington re-
turned to Veller's car in the restaurant owner's driveway, Veller raped Harring-
ton.314 He was subsequently convicted of the crime.315
Harrington sued the Board of Education for Delgado's negligence in
hiring an instructor with prior felony convictions.316 Under a Louisiana statute,
employers could be held primarily liable for negligent hiring, but a court still
had to determine whether a duty existed in the particular case.3 17 The court
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 714 So. 2d 845 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
306 Id. at 851.
307 Id. at 848.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 848, 850.
311 fd. at 850.
312 Id. at 848, 850.
313 Id. at 848.
314 Id. at 849.
315 Id.
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found that a duty of reasonable care in hiring exists when performing the duties
of the job will give the employee a unique opportunity to commit a crime
against a third party. 318 The court limited this duty to situations "where the
plaintiff met the employee as a result of the employment and the employer
would receive some benefit from the meeting had the wrongful act not oc-
curred.,319
Under this rule, the court determined that the community college had a
duty to use reasonable care when it hired a professor who would be placed in a
position of authority that enabled him to harm a student.320 "A professor is in a
position where character, moral turpitude, and a clean record should be essen-
tial. The risk of being raped or harmed by a professor in a position of authority
can be associated with the duty to use reasonable care when hiring.
' 32
'
The case most analogous to legal externships is Nova Southeastern Uni-
versity, Inc. v. Gross.322 As a Ph.D. candidate in the Nova Southeastern Univer-
sity psychology program, twenty-three-year old Bethany Gross was required to
complete an internship and assigned by the school to work at Family Services
Agency.323 After work one evening, she was abducted at gunpoint from the
agency parking lot and robbed and raped.324 Gross filed a negligence action
against the university and in response to the defendant's summary judgment
motion presented evidence that before her attack Nova was aware of a number
of criminal incidents in or near the parking lot.325 The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment, but Florida's Fourth Circuit reversed that ruling, and the Florida
Supreme Court upheld the appellate court ruling.326
Nova argued that it "did not owe Gross a duty because she was an adult
student, and therefore not within the ambit of a special relationship between a
school and a minor student,' '327 which exists because mandatory schooling
forces parents to rely on schools to protect their children during school activi-
ties.328 University attendance, on the other hand, is not mandatory, and universi-
318 Id. (citing Smith v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 540 So. 2d 363 (La. Ct. App. 1989)).
319 Id. (quoting Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1046 (La. 1991)).
320 Id. at 851.
321 Id. Actually, freedom from moral turpitude should be essential.
322 758 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2000).
323 Id. at 87-88. Students chose six internships from a list of sites approved by the university,
and the university made the final assignments from the students' choices. Id.
324 Id. at 88.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 87-88.
327 Id. at 88.
328 Id. at 89 (quoting Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658, 666 (Fla. 1982)).
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ties do not stand in loco parentis to adult students. Therefore, according to
Nova, this case did not present a special relationship giving rise to a duty.
329
The Florida Supreme Court responded that the appellate court had not
found a duty to Gross in the relationship between a minor child and public
school officials. 330 The district court had characterized the relationship as "es-
sentially the relationship between an adult who pays a fee for services, the stu-
dent, and the provider of those services, the private university.' 33 ' Within that
relationship, the control that Nova exerted over students by mandating intern-
ships and assigning sites imposed a duty to act reasonably in making the as-
332
signments.. Given Nova's knowledge of unreasonable dangers at the site, the
question of whether Nova breached that duty should not have been taken from
333the jury. The court declined to think of the university as different from any
other legal entity that must act reasonably in its activities: "There is no reason
why a university may act without regard to the consequences of its actions while
every other legal entity is charged with acting as a reasonably prudent person
would in like or similar circumstances., 334 Liability was premised upon negli-
gent conduct and not upon a failure to act.335 Nova's duty was not one of gen-
eral supervision but of ordinary care in assigning students to internship sites.
That could include, but was not necessarily limited to, a duty to warn of the
known dangers of sites. The court did not state what acts would fulfill the duty
but compared the obligation to that found in Silvers: "'students ... could rea-
sonably expect that the school's placement office would make some effort to
avoid placing [students] with an employer likely to harm them.', 336
A final critical feature of the case is that the court recognized that
weaknesses in the plaintiffs prima facie case and strong defenses should not
remove the case from the jury on no-duty grounds. In other words, the Florida
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 88.
332 Id. at 89.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 The court was not explicit that it found this to be a case of misfeasance rather than nonfea-
sance overcome by a special relationship or voluntary assumption, and it blurred the line between
voluntary assumption of duty and misfeasance by quoting at length the voluntary assumption of a
duty case, Union Park Memorial Chapel v. Hutt, 670 So. 2d. 64, 66-67 (Fla. 1966), while also
relying upon a misfeasance case, Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 1995). Nonetheless,
this does seem to be a decision based on misfeasance, as the court did not consider whether the
elements of voluntary assumption were met beyond that of an undertaking. See supra notes 88-95
and accompanying text.
336 Nova Southeastern, 758 So. 2d at 89. (quoting Silvers v. Associated Tech'l Inst., No.
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Supreme Court did not equate duty with liability. Although Nova argued that it
owed Gross no duty because she was aware that Family Services Agency was in
a dangerous area, her awareness of danger was relevant to breach, causation,
and comparative fault and did not eliminate a duty of care in making practicum
assignments.337
V. PREDICTING How COURTS WILL RULE
Nova Southeastern cannot signal on its own that duties will now be
found to student interns and externs. The law remains unsettled, and although
courts more frequently impose duties upon colleges and universities, no consis-
tent model for doing so has emerged. Part V ponders how courts are likely to
rule on the duties that law schools owe to student externs by considering first, in
Section A, the possibility that courts will improperly rely on the outdated Brad-
shaw line of cases, which could sound particularly convincing with regard to
adult, graduate students working away from their campuses. Even courts that
reject the no-duty bias of the Bradshaw line may still be influenced by their
characterization of students' suits as nonfeasance cases requiring special rela-
tionship exceptions or a voluntary assumption of duty. Section B, therefore,
considers how courts are likely to apply the special relationship and voluntary
assumption principles to the legal externship.
A. The Lingering Influence of the Post-Immunity Bradshaw Line of Cases
In a case decided as recently as 2000, lawyers for Nova Southeastern
University relied on the reasoning of post-immunity cases that colleges do not
owe adult students a duty of reasonable care to protect them from third parties
because college students are adults who are not in a custodial relationship with
their schools.338 Although their argument failed, it demonstrates the continuing
force that this view has for university counsel and suggests that the law student
who sues her school for injuries in an externship can still expect an argument
based on these cases. Despite decisions critical of the Bradshaw line and a ju-
dicial trend more receptive to students' duty arguments, some courts may still
choose - incorrectly - to apply Bradshaw and its offspring to reject a duty to
the legal extern. These cases do continue to be cited,339 and courts could find
the false logic of this line to ring more true when applied to the legal extern
wounded by an angry client or molested by her field supervisor than to the un-
dergraduate injured by her own intoxication or a fraternity prank.
Although the post-immunity cases too readily view the university as a
bystander to student injuries and therefore the student's claim as requiring an
337 Nova Southeastern, 758 So. 2d at 89.
338 Id. at 88.
339 See supra note 196.
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affirmative duty, courts may more convincingly characterize the law school's
role in externship injuries as nonfeasance and a third party as the sole risk crea-
tor: while away from the law school, working under someone else's direct su-
pervision, the law student was injured by a third party. Indeed, the Bradshaw
line of cases is so dismissive of the idea that the foreseeability of injuries trig-
gers responsibility for student safety that courts disinclined to impose a duty
might apply these cases to characterize the law school as a bystander even when
it has sent the student to a site known to be unreasonably dangerous. When the
court characterizes the law school's conduct as inaction that did not create the
risk to the student, the student will have to demonstrate either that she stood in a
special relationship with the law school or that the law school voluntarily as-
sumed a duty of care to her, and she should find this even more difficult under a
Bradshaw-type analysis than the unsuccessful undergraduate plaintiffs before
her.
A court following the post-immunity cases will require a custodial spe-
cial relationship to impose a duty34° - unlike more recent courts that have been
willing to see the relationship as special in other ways. Within that narrow view
of the possibilities, the law student is even more likely to lose the duty argument
because the relationship between extern and law school is more clearly not cus-
todial and, therefore, not special. The extern is not merely constitutionally
adult; she is really adult, with four years of college and at least two years of law
school behind her. Some externs may be in their thirties, forties, or older. The
truly adult law student, who can reasonably be expected to exercise greater care
for her own safety, certainly is not going to be considered in a relationship of
dependence upon the school for safety, especially when the point of the extern-
ship is to take the student off-campus into a workplace setting beyond the physi-
cal control and hands-on supervision of the school. A court guided by the post-
immunity decisions could voice astonishment that an adult graduate student
participating in an off-campus activity would expect more care than courts have
granted undergraduate minors on campus. Such astonishment would, of course,
ignore the fact that students' adult status was significant to the post-immunity
courts because they confused a limited ability to police student morals with the
ability to look out for student safety. 34 1 Still, when the injury stems from the
law student's own dangerous choices - like opening the office door to an angry
client after hours - the argument against a duty to an adult student whose be-
havior is beyond the law school's control can be persuasive.
Law school counsel in externship cases are also likely to emphasize the
idea from the Bradshaw line that a duty is inappropriate because the relationship
is educational and not protective.342 Although subsequent cases have made clear
that the university relationship with students is more multi-faceted than a merely
340 See supra notes 127-35, 150 and accompanying text.
341 See supra notes 207, 240-41 and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 174, 189 and accompanying text.
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educational one, the case rhetoric about the public policy value in giving stu-
dents leeway to make their own mistakes and learn from them has some force in
the externship context. The point of the externship relationship is to place stu-
dents in the real situations that they will confront as lawyers so that they can
reflect, learn, and grow - in part from their own mistakes.34 3 The instructive
mistakes that the externship provides are not limited to errors in research, writ-
ing, or legal analysis but are expected in the wide range of difficulties that law-
yers face, and these could be argued to include potentially dangerous interac-
tions. The courts in Baldwin and Beach reasoned, after all, that underage stu-
dents needed to learn from injuries caused by their own and their fellow stu-
dents' illegal intoxication rather than be protected from such mistakes and that
enforcing prohibitions against underage drinking on campus would interfere
with students' learning for themselves the dangers of drinking. 344 Dangers to
externs can be said to have curricular value - teaching the lawyer apprentice to
handle an abusive boss, a volatile client, a necessary trip to a dangerous neigh-
borhood. On the other hand, as the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned in
Furek,345 exercising some limited, reasonable care for externs, such as advance
instruction on common, dangerous situations for lawyers, should not really harm
the educational process. Students do not have to be injured to learn.
The injured extern should also expect the Bradshaw rhetoric that "the
modem American college is not an insurer of the safety of its students" to be
used against her.346 A court not inclined to recognize the difference between an
absolute duty to protect and a limited duty to exercise reasonable care towards
protection can easily say that the impossibility of fulfilling a duty to a student is
even greater when the issue is keeping off-campus (possibly thousands of miles
off-campus) students safe from arguably unforeseeable harms (like criminal
attacks in a courthouse parking lot). Given the difficulty of providing safety for
a legal extern located off-site, particularly for a law school that approves a wide
variety of sites over a wide geographic range, a court could declare that fulfill-
ing the burden would be impossible so that any duty would contravene public
policy by automatically imposing liability to injured students, making the law
school their insurer.
A court that follows the Bradshaw line of cases is likely to resist finding
assumed duties, particularly if the court believes, like the Third Circuit, that the
duty assumed must be a custodial duty of care for there to be any obligation at
all to the law student and declines to consider the possibility that more limited
obligations were undertaken and possibly breached.347 A Bradshaw-influenced
343 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
344 See supra notes 163, 174 and accompanying text.
345 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991); see supra note 240 and accompanying text.
346 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
347 See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
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court will not rule that creating the externship program is itself the assumption
of a duty of care in administering the externship. By sponsoring a sophomore
picnic, hiring resident assistants to supervise a dormitory, and sending students
on mandatory field trips, the defendants did not assume duties of care in Brad-
shaw, Baldwin, and Beach.348 Just as university rules regarding student conduct
in dormitories did not impose duties of enforcement in Baldwin and Rabel,3
49
any language in the externship agreement regarding the extern or field supervi-
sor's behavior will not be found to impose duties of enforcement upon the law
school. Although the ABA mandates site visits, 350 their point is to ensure the
educational value of the externship site, and so the site visit will not be inter-
preted as an assumption of a duty to protect. Even the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, one of the first courts to question the Bradshaw logic and find
that a student was owed a duty of care, declined to find that a post-secondary
vocational school had assumed a duty of care to a student intern by contracting
to make site visits to her internship.
351
Applying Bradshaw and its progeny to cases involving legal externs
would be a step backwards in the law governing the relationships between stu-
dents and universities. This line of cases has its roots in the judiciary's nostalgia
for a time when schools could exercise authoritarian control over students, re-
sentment over students' successful bids to obtain constitutional rights on cam-
pus, and desire to treat colleges and universities as unique places deserving im-
munity, despite the demise of the various doctrines that had long kept institu-
tions of higher education safe from liability. More thoughtful jurisdictions have
moved beyond the knee-jerk response that treats a college as free from responsi-
bility based on the idea that it is not the custodian of its students and have rec-
ognized fundamental flaws in the Bradshaw logic, flaws not overcome when the
injured student is a legal extern. The post-immunity cases often portray misfea-
sance as nonfeasance, equate duty with liability, assume that the special rela-
tionship must be custodial, take an all or nothing view of assumed duties, and
refuse to ask schools to live up to non-gratuitous promises to students.
Institutions of higher learning have often been actors creating risks in
situations in which they have been described as mere bystanders, and schools
often take on and then neglect safety responsibilities more limited than custodial
care. A duty of reasonable care does not mean absolute liability whenever an
injury occurs but liability when a failure to act reasonably causes injury, and
acting reasonably to reduce risks to students is not impossible, even when stu-
348 See supra notes 108-76 and accompanying text.
349 See supra notes 143-48, 182-89 and accompanying text.
350 See ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 305(f)(3) (2002).
351 Judson v. Essex Agric. & Tech'l Inst., 635 N.E.2d 1172 (Mass. 1994); see supra notes 275-
288 and accompanying text. The case in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court questioned the
Bradshaw logic was Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983), which is dis-
cussed supra at notes 200-216 and accompanying text.
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dents are adults with minds of their own. Courts have been too quick to raise
the duty shield, when the true question has been whether or not a duty was
breached, whether the lack of care was the cause of the student's injury, whether
the student's own fault has played such a significant role that it reduces or bars
the student's recovery. Fortunately, the approach taken immediately after col-
leges and universities lost their immunity is no longer the trend.352
B. Beyond Bradshaw: Seeking a Duty Model in Current Law
1. An Analysis Still Centered on Exceptions to No-Affirmative-
Duty Rules
A court that rejects the post-immunity assumption that colleges and uni-
versities do not owe a duty of care to their students will not automatically con-
clude that law schools do, therefore, owe their externs a duty of care. Law
schools will argue "no affirmative duty" when the legal extern has not been in-
jured by the law school itself but by a third party, and the duty dialogue may yet
center on whether the student was in some sort of special relationship with the
law school or whether the law school assumed a duty of care that it did not oth-
erwise owe the extern.
In the special relationship inquiry, no court is likely to decide that the
relationship between law school and law student is per se special, as court after
court has refused to find the relationship between college and undergraduate
student to be special in itself.35 3 In the case of a California Western law student
attacked on property adjacent to the law school library, a California appellate
court explicitly ruled that the relationship between a law student and a law
school is not special. 4 Although the extern might argue that the relationship at
issue is not the broad relationship between law student and law school but a
narrower relationship between extern and law school, the externship generally
does not place the student in a position of dependence upon the school for safety
by taking away her own ability to watch out for herself,355 and so courts would
352 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 105.
353 See supra notes 127-30, 148, 172-73 and accompanying text; see also Davidson v. Univ. of
N.C., 543 S.E.2d 920, 928 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 550 S.E.2d 771 (N.C. 2001).
354 Donnell v. Cal. W. Sch. of Law, 246 Cal. Rptr. 199, 200-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
355 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. If the case involved a law school that made
the field placement a graduation requirement and tightly controlled what sites were available to
the student, in part by limiting them to a very short list of sites that the school maintained relation-
ships with, the student might argue that she was dependent upon the school for safety in, at least,
site selection. The externship relationship might be found special and to impose care limited to
the issue of choosing sites and assigning students to them. The strongly held belief that the col-
lege student-to-college relationship is not special would probably keep a court from making such
an analysis, however. But see, however, Susan Brown Foster & Anita M. Moorman, Gross v.
Family Services Agency, Inc.: The Internship as a Special Relationship in Creating Negligence
Liability, 11 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 245, 251 (2001), suggesting that internships may be special
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not be persuaded to expand the traditional categories of special relationships to
include law schools and externs.
Courts have, however, been willing to regard the aspect of the relation-
ship that led to the injury as falling within recognized special relationships -
landlord and tenant, employer and employee, business and invitee. 356 Duty to
the legal extern under a special relationship analysis may turn, then, on whether
the externship relationship is sufficiently similar to a relationship already recog-
nized as special - but not the relationships of custodian to ward or school to
student.
Courts should not necessarily have to focus on exceptions to no-
affirmative-duty rules in these cases. The affirmative duty analysis is triggered
when the defendant is accused of nonfeasance - failing to take action to protect
the plaintiff from risks that the defendant has not created.357 In some cases, the
law school's role in an externship injury might well be viewed as misfeasance
- active conduct that caused a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to the
student. 358 Law schools do act in extermship situations. How they act may vary
from program to program, but they do not stand idly by. Law schools approve,
assign students to, and visit externship sites. A faculty member communicates
with the student throughout the externship and may provide an orientation at its
outset. Some externships have a concurrent classroom component. When any of
these actions created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of the harm that befell
the student, the court could choose not to describe the school's role as nonfea-
sance but as misfeasance, relieving the student of the difficulties of proving a
special relationship or a voluntary assumption of a duty. If, for example, the
law school had been aware of unreasonable dangers in the externship neighbor-
hood or abusive behavior of the field supervisor but continued to send students
to the site, the act of placing the student would be misfeasance, and affirmative
duty issues should not arise.359
Even if the field supervisor was not known to be a threat, the law school
should have a duty of care in a lawsuit based on harm caused by the supervising
attorney because the case would be premised on misfeasance. Choosing the
field supervisor is analogous to a negligent hiring case, such as Harrington.
360
As college education continues to expand beyond campus boundaries, non-
relationships.
356 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
357 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
358 KEETON, ET AL., supra note 87, at 373.
359 It is important to note, however, that foreseeability of injury plus misfeasance will not al-
ways add up to duty. The court may find, even where misfeasance is convincingly argued, that
public policy does not favor a duty in the particular case.
360 Harrington v. La. State Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 714 So. 2d 845 (La. Ct.
App. 1998); see supra notes 305-21 and accompanying text.
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traditional instructors will be more common, and courts are likely to find that
their selection imposes a duty. It is important to point out here the difference
between duty and liability. Although law schools may have a duty to exercise
care in field supervisor selection, courts might require little more than ascertain-
ing that the attorney is a member of the bar in good standing because lawyers
are subject to character and fitness scrutiny to be admitted to and remain mem-
bers of the bar. The dangerous supervisor case might not be winnable on duty
but quite winnable on breach.
2. Nova Southeastern and the Business Model
The relationship between law school and extem is most likely to be
compared to the relationship between a business and a customer, the comparison
made in Nova Southeastern by the Florida Supreme Court. 361 Analogizing the
legal extern to the clinical intern in Nova Southeastern, a court may determine
that in the context of the extemship relationship, the law school is a business
providing an educational service and that the student-customer is owed care in
that service. The court may either use this analogy to characterize the relation-
ship as a special, business relationship overcoming no duty rules, or as a case of
misfeasance by a business in its services.
Like the student in Nova Southeastern, the extern is an adult graduate
student gaining real word experience for academic credit. The Florida Supreme
Court believed that she was owed reasonable care in those services as much as
any adult paying for services is owed care in their rendering. "There is no rea-
son why a university may act without regard to the consequences of its actions
while every other legal entity is charged with acting as a reasonably prudent
person would in like or similar circumstances. 362 The court cited the opinion of
a Massachusetts trial court, which found that a post-secondary vocational school
owed students care in its job placement services.363 The placement office ren-
dered services for a fee, promoted its school with those services, and owed care
in their rendering as any business would. 364 The externship program similarly
places students with employers and collects tuition from the student extern for
the field placement.365 Some schools tout their externship programs as part of
their marketing programs. 366 By comparison, the law school may be found to be
a business charging students to place them in externship sites and to owe them a
361 Nova Southeastern Univ., Inc. v. Gross, 758 So. 2d. 86, 89-90 (Fla. 2000).
362 Id. at 90.
363 Id. (citing Silvers v. Associated Tech'l Inst., No. 934253, 1994 WL 879600 (Mass. Super
Ct. Oct. 12, 1994)).
364 See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
365 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
366 See supra note 8.
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duty of care within, at least, site selection.367 Possibly courts will accept Nova
Southeastern for the broad principle that when colleges and universities place
students in internships and externships for supervised, academic credit and re-
ceive tuition from the students, that as a business rendering services, they owe
students some duty of care in those services.
On the other hand, a court might distinguish the program under consid-
eration from the clinical psychology practicum at Nova and decline to apply the
decision. The Nova practicum was mandatory. Nova developed a list of pre-
approved practicum sites, and the student chose six sites from the list. Nova
made the final site assignment from the student's choices.368 The Florida Su-
preme Court found that by requiring the internship and assigning students to a
limited list of pre-selected locations, Nova had control over student conduct that
gave it a corresponding duty to exercise care in making the assignments.369 A
court that approves of the Nova Southeastern decision on its facts may reject an
analogy to a legal externship case if the law school had less control than Nova
exerted over the clinical psychology practicum. Because Bethany Gross had to
complete a practicum and was limited to one of Nova's pre-selected practicum
sites, Nova took away some of Gross's ability to care for herself, by denying her
the ability to reject field work and limiting her ability to reject particular sites as
too dangerous. Although some law schools may require clinical experience for
graduation, as Nova did, most do not. The law school's control over site as-
signments might also be distinguishable. While some may limit externships to a
specific prosecutor's office or legal aid clinic or to a list of specific pre-
approved sites, others have much less control over the sites and allow students
to locate their own externships and base approval of the site on how meaningful
the work will be and on no other considerations. 370 When a legal externship is
an elective course and the student has freedom to select her own site, a court
might reject an analogy to Nova Southeastern because the law school has not
taken away the student's ability to care for herself by rejecting a placement as
too dangerous. Either variable - whether the externship was required and how
much control the law school had over site selection - could support a law
school's argument that it simply did not have the kind of control shown in the
Nova Southeastern case and so did not have a similar duty.
In addition, where the student is primarily responsible for selecting the
externship site and the school's approval process is limited, the court may not
view the law school as in the business of providing field placement services, but
rather as providing a purely educational service, and therefore not find a duty
regarding site selection. Also, when the school is more detached from site se-
367 Part of the duty to select the site with care may well be a duty to select the field supervisor
with care. See supra text accompanying note 360.
368 Nova Southeastern, 758 So. 2d at 87-88.
369 Id. at 88.
370 See Seibel & Morton, supra note 4, at 423-26.
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lection, there is less likely to be an obligation to warn of dangers particular to a
given site because these dangers will not be known to the law school.
A legal extern who convinces a court to adopt the Florida Supreme
Court's view of the duties owed to student interns will not succeed in holding
the law school to a sweeping duty of care in all aspects of the extemship. In
clarifying that the duty to Gross could include, but was not limited to, warning
of known dangers at the particular site, the Florida Supreme Court quoted the
appellate court's statement that "We need not go so far as to impose a general
duty of supervision . .. to find that Nova had a duty, in this limited context, to
use ordinary care in providing educational services and programs to one of its
adult students. 37' While declining to say what conduct would fulfill the duty,
the court wrote that it would involve "some effort to avoid placing [students]
with an employer likely to harm them.,
372
Courts that have broken away from a broad rejection of duties to stu-
dents recognize that duty is not an all-or-nothing proposition and that duties can
be limited as is appropriate. When the Delaware Supreme Court used a business
invitee analogy to impose a duty on the University of Delaware to regulate and
supervise hazing, it concurred with the post-immunity cases that the "university
is not an insurer of the safety of its students" and stressed repeatedly that the
duty was limited, extending only to the acts of third persons that were foresee-
able and subject to university control.373 Control could be found in the "author-
ity to direct, restrict and regulate." 3
By analogy to Nova Southeastern, a court may find that the law school
had a duty to exercise care in the placement decision and a duty to warn students
of known dangers in the placement, but not a duty to provide on-going supervi-
sion and investigation of the student's safety at the extemship site. The duty to
protect student externs will be limited to facets of the externship experience that
the law school can control. A law school's argument, though, that control is not
possible because the externship is off-campus is not likely to carry much weight
as practical, off-campus experiences become more and more important in the
modern university and expand our concept of "campus." Also, control may be
found in the "authority to direct, restrict and regulate. 3 75 Therefore, a student
could convincingly argue that control was possible by forbidding certain activi-
ties from the outset of the externship. The law school executes an agreement
signed by the school, the student, and the field supervisor, and this agreement
could direct, restrict, and regulate what occurs in the externship. The court
371 Nova Southeastern, 758 So. 2d at 90. This may be because Gross herself premised the case
on negligence in making the practicum assignment and not on inadequate supervision.
372 Id. (citing Silvers v. Associated Tech'l Inst., No. 934253, 1994 WL 879600, at *3 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 1994)).
373 Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 517, 520-22 (Del. 1991).
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could, however, correctly consider certain restrictions at odds with the nature of
the externship relationship, which is to provide a real-world lawyering experi-
ence, and reject a duty to impose those restrictions. Finally, control is not the
only issue in limiting the duty. The unreasonable dangers of the activity must
have been foreseeable, and some student injury claims will stem from risks that
the law school could not have anticipated.
If a court adopts Nova Southeastern in an externship case where site se-
lection is primarily the student's responsibility, dangers will often be less fore-
seeable to the school, which may not be acquainted with the site beyond its veri-
fication that work will be sufficiently valuable to earn academic credit. Given
the burden of investigating the safety of all potential sites and field supervisors,
weighed against the educational and social value of legal externships, 76 a court
is much less likely to impose upon the law school that does not restrict extern-
ships to a limited, pre-approved list a duty to exercise care in the placement de-
cision or to warn of dangers particular to the site.
Sometimes, though, unreasonable dangers in the externship may be-
come apparent to the faculty advisor, and a court should impose a duty of care
consistent with the apparent dangers and the school's ability to exercise control
over them. When a student reported to me escalating verbal abuse from her
field supervisor, who had confessed both his attraction to her and that his medi-
cation made him so angry that he had thrown chairs, I told her not to return to
work and found alternate assignments for her to complete the remaining two
weeks of the externship. Had I done nothing, and had the student been attacked
by the field supervisor, my knowledge of the danger and my ability to do some-
thing about it would have supported a duty to exercise care to protect her from
this situation.
3. Voluntary Assumption of a Duty
In the post-immunity cases, courts analyzed whether colleges and uni-
versities had voluntarily assumed custodial duties of care and did not consider
whether more limited obligations had been assumed.377 This all-or-nothing view
of what duties could be assumed made voluntary undertaking an ineffective
argument for students because courts ruled that no custodial care was assumed
when schools promulgated rules against dangerous student behavior, hired dor-
mitory advisors, or sponsored student activities.378 Today, courts do not assume
that colleges and universities must undertake custodial duties to have safety
obligations to their students; they are more willing to look at what acts and
promises the school has undertaken and to determine whether care was owed in
376 See supra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
377 See supra notes 128-35, 150 and accompanying text.
378 See supra Part III.C.
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carrying out those acts and promises.379 For example, a court will not refuse to
find an assumed duty in prohibitions against underage drinking on campus on
the grounds that imposing such rules is not a voluntary assumption of custodial
care over students but will instead consider whether the school had, by promul-
gating the rules, voluntarily assumed a duty to enforce the rules.380 A court will
consider whether by hiring Greek advisors to attend fraternity and sorority par-
ties the college had assumed a duty to exercise care in supervising those par-
ties.38  The rules have not changed - the courts' willingness to apply them
accurately has changed, and this makes the injured extern's chances of demon-
strating a voluntary assumption of a duty greater than they once would have
been. The rules require the legal extern to prove three things: that a safety obli-
gation was undertaken, that she was injured either because the undertaking in-
creased the risk that befell her or because she relied on the undertaking, and that
the responsibility she seeks to impose on the law school falls within the scope of
the undertaking.382
The first important point is that to have assumed a duty, the defendant
must have undertaken a safety obligation - "rendering services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person
or things., 383 In Mullins, the college had provided campus security. 384 In Furek,
the university established rules against hazing and attempted to enforce them.385
In Coghlan, the school had staff supervisors attend Greek parties.386 Having
undertaken specific acts for the safety of their students, the schools had a duty to
exercise care in those acts - providing security, enforcing prohibitions against
hazing, supervising fraternity parties.
A student could not argue successfully that simply by establishing an
externship program, the law school had assumed a duty to exercise care to pro-
tect her from third-party dangers within the program. (After all, it's quite clear
that establishing a university does not create a duty to protect students from
third-party dangers at the university.) The student must show that the law
school undertook to render services that it recognized as necessary for her pro-
379 See, for example, the discussion of Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 987 P.2d 300
(Idaho 1999), beginning supra at text accompanying note 260. For a discussion of the current
state of the law regarding the assumption of duties by colleges and universities, see BICKEL &
LAKE, supra note 61, at 133-50.
380 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 156-57.
381 See Coghlan, 987 P.2d 300. This case is discussed supra in the text accompanying notes
260-74.
382 See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
383 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
384 See supra notes 209-15 and accompanying text.
385 See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
386 See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
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tection.387 Whether the law school assumed a duty of care in assigning students
to externship sites would depend upon the nature of the externship program.
When the program is linked to one or a very few sites, the choice to join forces
in a long-term relationship with those sites could be considered rendering a ser-
vice necessary for the safety of externs because the approval process for an on-
going partnership with a site might well involve considerations of site safety,
and students might expect safety to have been considered in long-term site se-
lection. When the law school leaves the site choice primarily to the student, an
undertaking is not likely to be found because then the approval process will be
more about ensuring that the student will be given meaningful work and experi-
ences and not used as a free, glorified go-fer.
Another place that the student might seek to demonstrate an assumption
of duty is in the externship agreement. If the agreement does not specifically
make promises related to the student's safety, it should not be enough to show
an assumed duty.388 In Judson, the externship agreement required the school to
visit the internship site, and so the student argued that by agreeing to visit the
site, the school had agreed to investigate the safety of the site and had breached
that obligation. The court interpreted the point of the visits to be educational, to
ensure that the student would learn as much as possible from the experience, and
therefore did not interpret the visits as a voluntary assumption of a duty of care
in making the visits. 389 Similarly, the ABA requires site visits to ensure the
educational value of the externship assignment, 390 and faculty visits to the field
placement should not be interpreted as voluntary assumptions of a duty of care
in those visits.
Externs might also point to orientation meetings as assumptions of duty,
but when an orientation addresses only requirements for reporting hours, turning
in journals, completing work assignments, and the like, the law school has not
undertaken services that it "should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the other's person or things. 391 On the other hand, when the orientation warns
students of dangers in the externship or counsels them how to handle dangerous
situations, this is an undertaking related to student safety, and if the other re-
387 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323. See, for example, Tollenaar v. Chino Valley
School District, 945 P.2d 1310, 1311-12 (Ariz. App. 1997), in which the court found that, by
imposing a closed-campus policy, the school district had not voluntarily undertaken to protect
students from injuring themselves by leaving campus during school hours. The parents of high
school students who violated the policy and were killed in an automobile accident presented no
evidence that by undertaking the closed-campus policy the school recognized, or should have
recognized, that it was necessary for the students' protection.
388 Even if a safety promise is made, there is some question as to whether a mere promise with-
out starting performance can be an undertaking. Courts, however, tend to try to find ways to
enforce safety promises. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
389 See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
390 ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 305(f)(3) (2002).
391 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323.
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quirements for voluntary assumption are met, a duty of reasonable care in pro-
viding those warnings would be imposed.
Undertaking to provide safety is not, by itself, enough to establish a
voluntary assumption of a duty. As the court explained in Mullins, the plaintiff
must have been injured either because she relied on the undertaking to be effec-
tive in protecting her or because the undertaking increased the risk of the harm
that befell her.392 The court found that Mullins, who had visited a number of
colleges, had seen security measures on campus and relied on them to protect
her. 9 In Furek, the university's complete incompetence in enforcing its hazing
prohibitions increased the danger to Furek of being injured by fraternity haz-
ing.3
94
So, for example, if a law school has undertaken a safety service by its
site approval process, a student attacked in the parking lot of one of the sites will
still have to demonstrate that she was injured because the site assignment in-
creased the risk of that injury to her or because she relied on the law school's
care in making assignment.395 If the site is not unreasonably dangerous, site
selection cannot be shown to have increased the risk to the student. If the stu-
dent's testimony indicates that she did not drop her guard or choose to walk
alone to the lot because she expected the school to have chosen the site with
care, then injurious reliance will be difficult to show. Also, reliance will be
difficult to prove if the student fully realized the dangers of the site before regis-
tering for the externship.
Similarly, reasonable orientation advice that does not encourage stu-
dents to engage in risky behaviors or create a false sense of security that stu-
dents rely on to their detriment should not be the basis for an assumed duty.
Unreasonable orientation advice, however, could increase the risk of harm to
students ("Never pass up an opportunity to work alone with your boss after
hours") or induce reliance ("Although you should be alert, we wouldn't send
you to a site we hadn't checked out thoroughly") and support an assumed duty
theory.
Finally, the assumed duty will be limited to the scope of the undertak-
396ing. For example, by providing an externship orientation that gives general
safety advice, the law school does not assume a duty regarding site inspection or
supervision but assumes only a duty to exercise care in giving the warnings.397
392 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323; supra note 211 and accompanying text.
393 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
394 See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
395 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
396 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
397 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. When warnings are voluntarily provided, the
only duty assumed is to warn with care. This is because, when a defendant has undertaken a spe-
cific task, the defendant is required to perform only that specific task with care. See, e.g., Davis v.
Westwood Group, 652 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Mass. 1995) (finding that, by hiring an officer to direct
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Even where a court believes that the site assumes a duty of care in site selection,
it will not expand that duty to encompass safety supervision at the site.
As I have mentioned, one of my former externs worked for an abusive
supervising attorney. As she began her externship, I did not have a duty to pro-
tect her from him, but she sought my counsel on how to handle him, and I ad-
vised her. We talked regularly about strategies for keeping matters professional,
and I sent her articles on corporate psychology and how to manage a difficult
boss. By that counsel, did I assume a duty to her?
First, did I undertake services that I perceived as important to her
safety? Based on our interaction as I have just described it, the lawyer for the
law school would likely argue that I advised the student regarding "keeping mat-
ters professional" and did not begin rendering services for the extern's safety.
And that is an accurate description of our initial consultations. At first, I just
thought that the supervising attorney was overly critical and insensitive, and
when I first talked about his harsh criticisms and sent the articles, I was not mo-
tivated by concern for the student's safety but wanted to help her manage the
field supervisor so that he would provide clearer and more appropriate expecta-
tions, priorities, and feedback. At that point, no safety duty was assumed. After
time, though, the supervisor began to appear potentially dangerous to the extern
because of his mercurial temperament, which he admitted was affected by medi-
cations, and our conversations turned to her safety working in his office. I be-
gan to question her about her perception of the degree of threat that he pre-
sented. It may be that a court would find that once I began any conversation
focused on safety, I had begun rendering services related to her safety. Cer-
tainly, when my advice became safety advice, the first step towards establishing
a voluntary assumption would be met.
My former extern was not physically harmed by her hot-tempered su-
pervisor, and so the question of whether I assumed a duty by rendering safety
advice now becomes hypothetical.398 If one evening, working late on a project,
the student went into the attorney's office where he berated her and then threw
his chair at her, striking and injuring her, the next question would be whether
my advice in any way increased the risk of that danger. If, for example, I gave
pedestrians across a state highway from the parking lot to the defendant's greyhound track, the
defendant did not undertake the broader duty of providing safe passage across the highway by
means of a pedestrian bridge or traffic light); see also Hinson v. Black, 572 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2002) (finding that defendant did not assume a duty to prevent injury to the decedent
when he warned her not to go onto the balcony while intoxicated), cert. denied, No. 503C0196,
2003 Ga. LEXIS 61 (Ga. Jan. 13, 2003). The duty to warn with care is not assumed unless the
warning increased the risk to the plaintiff or her harm was suffered in reliance on the warning.
Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc., 50 P.3d 697, 703 (Wyo. 2002).
398 That, in itself, merits comment. Duty rules tell parties how to behave, but a voluntary as-
sumption of duty cannot be fully assessed until after an injury has occurred and the opportunity
for exercising care has passed. How then do the voluntary assumption rules help guide behavior?
They tell what kind of conduct assumes a duty and how broad the scope of the assumed duty will
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her suggestions about how her work product and behavior might avoid conflict
but did not tell her that she should not remain alone in his solo office with him
after hours, she might claim that by omitting that warning, my advice increased
the risk to her. I might also be argued to have increased the risk if I had advised
her to be more assertive and her assertiveness then triggered the attack, or if I
telephoned the field supervisor to discuss his behavior and my comments set
him off. The extern could also contend that she relied on the undertaking if, for
example, she had been thinking about asking to be removed from the externship
but believed that because I had asked her questions about the office atmosphere
and had not suggested her removal, she remained on the site in reliance on my
assessment that it was safe. If I spoke with her field supervisor regarding my
concerns about his temperament and then reported back to the student that I
thought the conversation had gone well, she could contend that she worked late
with him because she assumed I had reduced the danger.
Whatever duty I assumed, though, would be limited to the scope of my
undertaking. If all I undertook to do was advise the student about how she her-
self could best handle her temperamental employer, she may not be able to
premise her claim on my failure to consult with the field supervisor or to remove
her from the site. She might be able to argue, though, that I had voluntarily as-
sumed a duty to assess the risks of her placement, and that I breached that duty
by underestimating the threat the field supervisor posed to her. If I spoke with
her supervisor, she might contend that I had undertaken to reduce the dangers.
VI. CONSIDERING DUTY BASED ON A FACILITATOR MODEL OF
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Inadequacies of the Business Model
Duty rules for colleges and universities should promote a safe learning
environment, which the post-immunity cases, by placing all responsibility for
student safety upon the students themselves, failed to do. This imbalanced legal
model encouraged colleges and universities to stand idly by in the face of risks
to students because they feared that any protective action would assume duties
not otherwise owed.399 Judicial use of business models to impose duties at-
tempts to provide a more appropriate balance of responsibility, and courts can
be expected to continue to analogize colleges and universities to landlords, em-
ployers, and other businesses because this is familiar territory and does not re-
quire the courts to develop a model specifically for the relationship between
college students and their schools. °° Still, while the business model does seek
to balance safety obligations on American campuses, the model is imposed by
way of analogy and is not tailored to the unique features of colleges and univer-
399 BICKEL& LAKE, supra note 61, at 133-35.
400 Id. at 181.
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sities. Duty, though, is dependent upon the nature of the relationship between
the parties, and college students deserve a model that reflects their unique situa-
tion, not one cobbled together by a series of analogies to other relationships.
The business model ignores that the university is not an ordinary business and
that "[s]tudents are not ordinary consumers buying a sandwich or shirt. ''4°1 Crit-
ics have contended that a business model tends to divide responsibility rather
than establish the shared safety responsibility appropriate to life in the college
402
community, does not address the unique aspects of the business of running a
college or university, and cannot strike the right balance between university
authority and student freedoms, so that it is too protective of students in some
situations and not protective enough in others.4 °3
Another flaw in decisions that apply various business models of special
relationships to universities and students is that these cases consider special rela-
tionships at all. The post-immunity era so entangled the duties of colleges and
universities with the law of special relationships that courts generally assume
that the law of affirmative duties and special relationships must be evoked
whenever students sue their colleges for negligence.4° Yet very often, the col-
lege or university has acted in a way that created a risk, and the analysis should
not turn to whether the school was acting in a landlord special relationship or
business special relationship or assumed a duty of care to the student.4°5 The
401 Id. at 182.
First, if students are consumers, then they should be entitled to get what they
want and pay for .... [W]e have given them this, for example with grade in-
flation. When universities have canceled beer privileges, students have rioted
violently: as consumers paying more money than ever, they feel entitled to get
what they pay for and be left alone. Students who view themselves as con-
sumers often assert the very radical and libertarian aspects of freedom which
the bystander cases described. In short, when applied to colleges, strict busi-
ness paradigms tend to polarize student conduct.
Id. at 184.
402 Id. at 184. Professors Bickel and Lake have stated,
Restoring community values - shared responsibilities - on campus can
make campuses safer and less violent places. Business rules work well to
promote safety at K-Mart, but young people on campus do not live at K-Mart
or even spend significant amounts of their lives there.... A consumer has lit-
tle investment in making a store safer for others; every student depends on
other students for safety on campus.
Id. at 185.
403 Id. at 184.
404 Id. at 179-80.
405 Let us make this perfectly clear: Universities can owe duties to their students
on and off campus irrespective of whether there is a special relationship of
any kind. Legal special relationships only potentially enhance responsibility
to include affirmative duties to proactively prevent harm even when caused by
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business model cases perpetuate the incorrect assumption that all these cases
must be analyzed as affirmative duty scenarios that require injured students to
demonstrate special relationships or fit university actions into the elements of a
voluntarily assumed duty where the university simply may have acted in a dan-
gerous way appropriate for imposing a duty without such an analysis.4 6
The law school is so closely involved in the student's use of its extern-
ship "product" that it is more than a business selling an externship. The law
school guides the student through a practice run for life as a lawyer, with site
approval, an externship agreement, orientation, faculty supervision, and site
visits. In this practice run, the adult law student is given real work by a real
employer away from the campus, and so the relationship must, for practical pur-
poses, place significant safety responsibility with the extern. A straight busi-
ness analogy is a clumsy fit for this delicate balance of control and freedom.A reality of this practice run is that legal externs will be exposed to the
dangers that lawyers face daily, and a model that places all responsibility on the
extern on the grounds that this is a working adult may discourage law schools
from taking simple steps that will make the externship safer, while a model that
imposes broad safety responsibilities on the law school as a business pocketing
the extern's tuition payment could fail to recognize the adult law student's own
significant responsibility for keeping safe in an exercise in making the transition
to being responsible for one's professional life. Finally, the duty model applied
to externships should consider that there is a third party with significant respon-
sibility for the student's safety - the firm, agency, or other office where the
student works.
When a court turns to a business model, it has assumed that the case is
based on nonfeasance when such an assumption may simply be incorrect. The
business law approach looks at all university conduct not as misfeasance but as
possible voluntary assumptions of duty, when the key question may really be
whether the law school has acted in a way that has unreasonably exposed the
student to foreseeable dangers. The Nova Southeastern case, for example,
seems to blur the question of the care owed by businesses in all services that
they render with the issue of voluntarily assuming a duty and thereby being ob-
ligated to carry it out non-negligently. 4°7 This creates a knotty problem of trying
to sort out what externship behaviors are business behaviors in which care is
third parties, non-negligent forces, and/or students themselves. Special rela-
tions are not prerequisites to duty, per se, but only prerequisites to certain
kinds of duty to take affirmative action. Custodial relations are only a subset
of special relationships. This is basic tort law.
Id. at 180.
406 For example, to use the example from Part III.C.3, supra, if an externship advisor gave the
student bad advice, why shouldn't that be analyzed as misfeasance rather than as an affirmative
duty problem that requires a voluntary assumption of the risk analysis?
407 See supra note 334.
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generally owed and which are voluntarily assumed duties in which care is owed
limited to the scope of the voluntary assumption.
As the next section discusses, a fitting duty model for externship pro-
grams seems to be the facilitator model proposed by Professors Bickel and
Lake. Describing appropriate university conduct, their model accurately mirrors
the externship relationship as one in which the college or university provides
"[i]nformation, training, instruction and supervision, discussion, options, and, in
some cases, withdrawal of options" to create an atmosphere in which students
make choices for themselves and bear significant responsibility for the conse-
quences of their choices. 40 8 In this model, unreasonable risks that arise from the
university's improper planning, guidance, and instruction are borne by the uni-
versity, and comparative fault plays a significant role.409 The model works well,
too, by detaching the law of duties owed to colleges and universities from the
law of affirmative duties and special relationships and using a duty balancing
test to decide the issue.410
B. The Facilitator University - An Appropriate Model for Externships
1. The Facilitator Model
In reality, the responsibility for the legal extern's safety will be shared,
and so the proper legal model for the relationship should reflect that reality.
During the externship, the law student will, for practical reasons, shoulder sig-
nificant responsibility for her own safety because she is away from campus in a
real-world experience, where what the school can do to protect her is limited.
Yet the law school does establish the rules for and often the setting of the ex-
ternship, provide guidance to the student, and act in other ways that influence
student safety. The facilitator university model developed by Robert D. Bickel
and Peter F. Lake is particularly suited to reflecting the reality of the relation-
ship and guiding law school behavior and judicial analysis of the duty question
regarding externships. 41 "A facilitator college," according to Bickel and Lake,
"balances rights and responsibilities - it is neither extremely authoritarian nor
overly solicitous of student freedom. Importantly, a facilitator college seeks
shared responsibility rather than allocating it unilaterally or not at all. ' 41 2 A
408 BICKEL& LAKE, supra note 61, at 193.
4W Id. at 195.
410 Id. at 202.
41 It must be noted at the outset, however, that no court has yet explicitly adopted this model,
as of a March 2003 Westlaw search. Bickel and Lake do contend that many courts have implicitly
applied this approach. Id. at 193. In addition, one of their articles about the facilitator university
is noted with approval in a footnote to Nova Southeastern Univ., Inc. V. Gross, 758 So. 2d 86, 89
n.2 (Fla. 2000).
412 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 192.
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facilitator university places a significant amount of responsibility for student
safety on the students themselves, but - like the well-run externship program
- it also "provides as much support, information, interaction, and control as is
reasonably necessary and appropriate in the situation" for students to exercise
that responsibility intelligently and adapts to the needs of the particular student
body.413
Unlike parents, facilitators do not choose for students. Students
must choose for themselves and shoulder significant responsi-
bility for outcomes of their choice. The key is that the facilita-
tor manages the parameters under which choices are made. In-
formation, training, instruction and supervision, discussion, op-
tions, and, in some cases, withdrawal of options are all appro-
priate for facilitators. A facilitator (instructor or student affairs
professional) is keenly aware of aberrant risks and risks known
only to the more experienced. A facilitator is very aware of the
types of students and the particular university community. Lim-
ited roles are fine for adult students who 'just want classroom
education.' Greater roles are usually appropriate for less mature
tweenagers, particularly those in full time on-campus living ar-
rangements. In other words, a facilitator adapts and varies the
level and nature of involvement.41 4
The facilitator university does not abdicate its authority or proper duties
and accepts responsibility for "those unreasonable risks that would arise from
lack of proper university planning, guidance, instruction, etc.''415 Furthermore,
"[tihe facilitator is responsible to provide reasonable conditions of background
safety in the interest of the student's educational pursuits.' '416 As an example,
Bickel and Lake suggest, clearly thinking of Nova Southeastern,417 "A facilitator
university would allow a student to visit a family services center on her own, but
it would not assign her there as an intern without making some determination
that it was a reasonably safe place for her to be and that she would receive
proper orientation at the facility."4 8 The modem facilitator university should be
alert for potential dangers to students and facilitate positive behavior by students
to avoid those dangers.419 Within this model, comparative fault is important,
413 Id. at 193.
414 Id.
415 Id. at 195.
416 Id. at 203.
417 Nova Southeastern Univ., Inc. v. Gross, 758 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2000).
418 BICKEL& LAKE, supra note 61, at 195-96.
419 Id. at 196.
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and the student who fails to exercise carefully her responsibility for her own
safety should find her recovery reduced or barred. 420 But unlike the bystander
model, the facilitator model does not find that student responsibility means no
university responsibility, that student negligence means no university duty.
This model distinguishes duty from liability and encourages reasonable
facilitation of student activities. When the university has acted as a reasonable
facilitator, the student will survive a summary judgment on duty grounds, but
the jury will rule in the university's favor because it did not breach its duty.
When the university did not act reasonably, but unforeseen events or significant
carelessness by the student plaintiff led to the injury, duty will not keep the case
from the jury, but the university should win on causation or bar or significantly
reduce student recovery on comparative fault grounds. If the question is reason-
able facilitation, the duty issue is separated from the murky area of the law of
affirmative duties, special relationships, and voluntary assumption of duty be-
cause it is no longer necessary to distinguish nonfeasance from misfeasance,
misfeasance from assumed duties.42'
Bickel and Lake hope that universities will use the facilitator model to
guide their practices regarding student safety and that courts will use the model
to understand the nature of the relationship between college and student and to
guide their duty analysis and impose those duties appropriate to assign a facilita-
tor.422 The question remains whether this model can create some predictability
in this area of the law. The facilitator model, after all, involves much flexibility.
The university adapts to the student body and to different situations; the balance
of rights and responsibilities depends upon the types of students and the type of
situation at hand. How, then, can the facilitator model create predictability?
The best test for this, Bickel and Lake believe, is a policy-driven factor analysis
that "may be the only undeniable point of consensus among all the disparate
cases of the last few decades. '' 23 In determining whether the college owed the
student a duty, the court should weigh:
(1) foreseeability of harm;
(2) nature of the risk;
(3) closeness of the connection between the college's act or
omission[] and student injury;
(4) moral blame and responsibility;
420 Id. at 195-96.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Id. at 202.
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(5) the social policy of preventing future harm (whether finding
duty will tend to prevent future harm);
(6) the burden on the university and the larger community if
duty is recognized;
(7) the availability of insurance.424
Existing case law, they say, has shown how these principles should be
applied in certain recurring scenarios, and it will fall upon courts in future deci-
sions to be clear about what will and will not be required under a factor analysis
of facilitator responsibility.425 The advantage is that in the future, the discussion
will be more straightforwardly and accurately about the kind of relationship
truly shared between college and student, no hiding behind de facto immunities,
no shoe-homing the relationship into familiar categories.
How, then, would the facilitator model apply to the externship situation?
There are two concerns: how does the law school behave as a reasonable facili-
tator of the externship, and when should courts impose duties upon the law
school under this model? The next two sections address these questions.
2. Using the Facilitator Model to Guide Extemships
In the externship program, the facilitator law school, the extern, and the
supervising attorney in the field will share responsibility for the student's safety.
A significant amount of that shared responsibility will fall upon the law student,
who, for most safety issues, will be in a far better position than the law school to
keep herself safe. Nonetheless, shared responsibility does place some safety
obligations on the law school and upon the externship site.
In planning and structuring the externship, the law school can address
426the issue of reasonable background safety. A significant part of background
safety is site selection. Sometimes the law school is solely responsible for
choosing the site, as when it creates an externship program that is connected to a
limited list of sites. In that situation, it has a responsibility to determine that the
site has no unreasonable dangers, particularly the kinds of dangers that good
orientation advice cannot significantly reduce. This responsibility must fall
upon the law school because it is not a responsibility that can be shared with the
student; the law school is making the choice, not the student. On the other hand,
when the student chooses the site, and the law school's approval is limited to the
educational value of the placement, the far greater share of the responsibility for
a safe choice should lie with the student who is making the choice. The law
424 Id. at 202.
425 Id. at 202, 204.
426 Id. at 203.
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school should advise students to consider safety in making the choice and make
clear that the school has no opinion regarding the safety of the site. The extern-
ship agreement should state that the student has chosen the site, that she under-
stands that the law school has not evaluated its safety, and that she assumes the
risk of dangers in the site.
427
Sometimes, though, when students choose their own sites, other stu-
dents will have worked at the sites before them. Law schools should keep track
of safety concerns raised by students and faculty mentors regarding individual
sites. If concerns are raised about a site's safety, some responsibility should lie
with the law school before sending another student there because the school now
has reason to be concerned about safety and does have the ability to do some-
thing about it. It can withdraw the option of this particular site, if the prior stu-
dent's accounts suggest it is unreasonably dangerous. When externs go to sites
where previous externs have worked, they may be less vigilant for their own
safety, assuming that the site has not presented problems, or they would not
have been sent there. If the school does not regard the dangers as so high as to
be outweighed by the value of the experience the site affords, the school must at
least give students the information necessary for them to decide whether they
want to accept the site and to keep the appropriate vigilance if they do go there.
The law school cannot provide physical protection to students at their
externship sites, but as a facilitator, it can provide at an externship orientation
the information that will help students make good choices about their own
safety. Although law students are adults and some have come to law school
from other careers, a sector of the externship population will have gone from
their high schools to a college campus to a law school campus and may yet be
unsophisticated with regard to the wider world. Law schools should not hesitate
to provide general safety information for fear that by doing so they will have
assumed broad duties with regard to safety. The only duty assumed by provid-
ing safety information is to give that information with reasonable care.4 8 Stu-
dents might be cynical, as they are law students, that safety talk is just an at-
tempt to place legal liability on the student. This advice might be more convinc-
ing if it comes from someone outside the school. Also, should concerns have
arisen about any particular sites, but not to the level that withdrawal of the site
would be appropriate, students should be alerted to known dangers at particular
locations. This provides them the information they will need to keep themselves
safe.
Student safety can also be addressed in the externship agreement. As an
agreement among three parties, the law school, the law student, and the field
supervisor, the agreement can place certain obligations with the supervising
attorney to ensure that the student receives proper information about any safety
427 Foster & Moorman, supra note 355, at 260-61.
428 See supra note 397.
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issues particular to the site or work assignments that she will receive.429 It can
require the field supervisor to agree to abide by law school regulations regarding
sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination. 430 The agreement can also
prohibit activities that the school finds too risky, such as, perhaps, over-night
travel with field supervisors of the opposite sex.
Throughout the externship, the student communicates with a faculty ad-
visor. If anything in the conversation raises alarm bells, the faculty advisor
should discuss it with the student to ensure that the student knows how to handle
such situations and to discern whether the student is exposed to an unreasonable
danger. A student told me in her e-mailed journal that she had been working
alone at night in the office when an angry client began pounding on the door
demanding to be let in. At the time, I did not realize I was following a facilita-
tor model, but I questioned her about what she had done. As it turns out, she did
not open the door and called one of the attorneys to determine just how scared
she should be of this particular client before she attempted to walk to her car.
We discussed her parking arrangements and how safe they were and how often
she worked alone at night and whether that was a good idea or not. If our con-
versation had not assured me that she faced no unreasonable dangers, I could
have, as a facilitator, withdrawn certain options from her.43 1 I could have told
her that she was not to work alone after hours and could have explained the rea-
sons to her field supervisor. Fortunately, this step was not necessary because
through supervision and consultation, I felt comfortable that the student was
safe. If a student in an externship raises particularly high safety concerns -
such as a sexually harassing supervising attorney - the student may need to be
removed from the placement.
The point of site visits is educational, but should any concerns arise dur-
ing the visit, the faculty supervisor should address them with the field supervisor
and the student. The site visit should not turn into a safety inspection, in part
because the kinds of dangers most likely to affect students would not be observ-
able in the site visit. The site visitor would not notice the irate client who may
show up the next day in a rage, and the sexually harassing field attorney is likely
to be on his best behavior during the site visit. If the professor who supervises
the student's journals is not the same professor who makes the site visit, the two
should communicate before and after the site visit regarding any safety con-
cerns. When safety concerns arise, a conversation should be held with the stu-
dent and with the field supervisor. The point of talking to the supervisor is to
find out what degree of danger is involved, and the point of talking to the stu-
dent is to assess whether the student is aware of the danger and knows how best
to conduct herself to avoid that danger.
429 It would also be possible to ask the field supervisors to enter indemnity agreements, but
they might decline to accept externs on those terms.
430 Foster & Moorman, supra note 355, at 261.
431 BICKEL & LAKE, supra note 61, at 193.
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Law schools have limited control over the safety of students in extern-
ships. Their greatest point of control is in site selection, in making sure that
students are not sent to unreasonably dangerous sites. Beyond that, all that they
really can do is guide and advise the student about how best to keep safe in gen-
eral and with regard to any known dangers at the site. They can, through the
journals, keep an eye out for safety concerns, and when those arise assess the
student's ability to deal with those dangers and speak to the field supervisor if
necessary. The only other control that the school has is to remove the student
from the site if dangers seem unreasonable. Students, though, may be resistant
to this if it means losing the credit for that particular term. At such a point a
waiver may be appropriate. Courts are more likely to impose duties upon col-
leges and universities with regard to student safety, and therefore schools must
avoid liability by not breaching obligations rather than by doing as little as pos-
sible out of fear of assuming duties they would not otherwise have. To avoid
liability for student injuries, schools should act as reasonable facilitators to pre-
vent such injuries.
3. Judicial Application of the Facilitator Model to Externships
I supervised a student extern who worked for a solo practitioner special-
izing in international law. One day the student called me because her field su-
pervisor had asked her to go on a business trip with him to Italy and she wanted
permission to accompany him. This was the same field supervisor who, she had
disclosed to me earlier, told her that she had been hired because she was pretty.
"Look around you," he said. "Do you see anyone unattractive in this office?"
She had also reported to me more than once his moodiness, quick temper, and
harsh manner of criticism. He also often dangled the carrot of whether he would
hire her at the end of the externship. Together with the head of the externship
program I made clear to her that she was forbidden to take the European trip.
4 32
But what if we had allowed the student to travel outside the country and
the supervising attorney had harmed her in some way on the trip? If the extern
sued the law school, could the school argue that it had no duty to protect her
from her field supervisor and thereby escape liability?
Under the facilitator factor analysis, a court would first consider the
*foreseeability of harm, which is the key element in determining duty. Here, a
sexist male attorney, who has not been particularly happy with a female stu-
dent's work product, wants nonetheless to take her with him out of the country
on business. The sexist male attorney has admitted that he finds the student
attractive, and he is known to have a hot temper. The chances that alone in a
foreign country this student will be vulnerable to some kind of sexual assault, a
severe nature of risk, by the attorney seem to be unreasonably high. Also, with
432 In other words, instead of consulting with her and helping her make her own choice, we
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his temper, he could be foreseen to present some danger of other physical attack.
While defense counsel might argue that the closeness of connection between the
law school's act or omission and the student's injury is attenuated, because it
was the supervising attorney and not the law school who inflicted the harm, this
is a simple case where the student asked permission, and the school, aware that
granting permission would expose the student to an unreasonable danger from
the field supervisor, gave permission anyway. Had permission been withheld,
the student would not have been injured, and the connection seems close.
Moral blame and responsibility would seem to lie with a law school
willing to permit a young woman to travel outside the country with a sexist male
in a position of power over her academic credit and career development.
The next issue is the social policy of preventing future harm. Future ex-
terns will be safer if law schools recognize that they must exercise care in grant-
ing permission to travel with a field supervisor who has presented some ques-
tions about the danger he presents to the student. Schools will be less likely to
grant such permission, and so fewer students will be exposed to such dangers.
Indeed, schools may simply decide that traveling with field supervisors should
not be allowed.
Next we consider the burden on the university and the larger commu-
nity if a duty is recognized. Law school counsel might contend there would be a
chilling effect on useful externship experiences if schools become afraid to al-
low students to travel with supervising attorneys, but this seems to be a weak
argument. Although one, small opportunity would be lost without travel, the
externship will still provide significant opportunities for the students to grow in
their legal analysis and writing, factual investigation, communications skills,
counseling skills, organization skills, and so forth. Law school counsel might
also contend that determining whether the travel opportunity presents a danger
would be burdensome, but a duty would only be imposed where dangers of the
particular travel opportunity are foreseeable. Here, they were. Courts should
not find that, broadly, travel with a supervisor presents a foreseeable, unreason-
able danger to an extern.
Finally, the court will consider who usually insures for such risks, and it
is likely that the law schools do not insure against student injuries in field
placements and more likely that they use the externship agreement to place that
responsibility on the law firm, agency, or other office where the student will be
working. Of course, where the student is a victim of an intentional tort by the
supervising attorney, it is unlikely that the site will have coverage for the inci-
dent either.
On balance, it would seem that a duty was owed to this student to exer-
cise care in the decision whether to permit her to go on the trip. A serious, un-
reasonable risk was foreseeable, and the student's injury was directly linked to
the decision to permit her to travel with the attorney. By exposing her to possi-
ble sexual harassment or assault, the school seems to be morally blameworthy
and the burden was minimal: simply deny permission to travel outside the coun-
try with the attorney. Future applications of such a duty would not be burden-
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some in the sense that they deny significant opportunities to externs or subject
the public to less highly trained attorneys.
Outside this hypothetical, what predictions could be made as to how a
facilitator model, analyzed through the factors, would affect the issue of a law
school's duty to injured student externs? Again, the key issue isforeseeability,
and most often the kinds of dangers that will harm externs will be the random,
unanticipated sort. A client, unknown and unknowable to the law school, bears
a grudge against an attorney where the student is an extern, and the student is
injured in an attack on the attorney. An opposing party in a divorce case, angry
with the results of a hearing, attacks the extern. As these are dangers that the
law school could not anticipate, their lack of foreseeability will weigh so heavily
in the analysis that a duty should not be found. In addition, with these possible
but not probable events, the burdens involved, if a duty is imposed, would be
extreme, rendering the law school an insurer of student safety.
The law school can control the factor of moral blameworthiness by act-
ing responsibly towards students, by not establishing sites known to be unrea-
sonably dangerous or returning students to sites where unreasonable dangers are
known.
Another factor that should be considered is the social value of extern-
ships themselves, which are training grounds for future lawyers, provide support
to public service and government agencies, and encourage some students to pur-
sue public service careers.433 Courts, therefore, should be hesitant to impose any
responsibilities that would chill the externship experience.
VII. CONCLUSION
The law regarding the duties that colleges and universities owe their
students continues to evolve and still is influenced by the post-immunity era in
which courts used the constitutional adult status of students against them to cre-
ate a de facto immunity through duty law. That influence is ever-decreasing as
courts become more and more open to imposing obligations of care upon institu-
tions of higher learning. What this means for law schools is that courts may
compare the externship program to a business relationship that imposes a duty
of care upon the law school, as it would upon any business rendering services, to
exercise care in that relationship. Under this business model, courts may be
inclined to limit the duty to care in site selection and warning of known dangers
at the externship site and certainly would not impose it for unforeseeable dan-
gers or those outside the law school's control. The fact that the externship is not
served on the law school campus will not, however, place the student's safety
outside the law school's control. Also, courts may be more willing to find that
by certain acts within the externship the law school has assumed a duty of care
in those acts. Finally, courts may move towards a facilitator model that regards
the nature of the relationship as one in which the school's primary role in stu-
433 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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dent safety is to plan, guide, instruct, train, and consult, and where significant
responsibility is placed upon the student herself for her own safety. The critical
point is that courts are likely to impose some legal responsibility upon law
schools for extern safety, and therefore, law schools seeking to avoid liability
should not depend upon no-duty arguments to shield them but should instead
conduct themselves so that no-breach arguments will.
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